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Local Government Law
by I. Perry Sentell, Jr."
The City Attorney served (in those days) simultaneously as Judge of
the Recorder's Court. On convening that court one Monday morning, he
was shocked to see one of the community's most prominent citizens
before him, charged with "drunk and disorderly."
I inquired as to the type of plea he wished to enter. Evidently having
heard of "nolo contendere" but not remembering the exact nature or
pronunciation of the plea, the citizen responded: "I would like to plead
low profile."'
The "law" of local government, both decisional and statutory,
frequently fosters a similar sentiment.
I.

MUNICIPALITIES

A.

Annexation
Georgia municipal annexations are accomplished through two basic
methods: (a) the General Assembly's enactment of a local annexation
statute; and (b) the municipality's adoption of an annexation ordinance. 2

* Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard
University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
Deep appreciation is expressed to the Carl Vinson Institute of Government of the
University of Georgia for summer research support which contributed most significantly
to the preparation of this survey.
1.

An account from R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw: LITE (1997). For

a general "profile" of Georgia local government law, those who practice it, and the practice
itself, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., A PROFILE: THE PEOPLE AND THE PRACTICE OF GEORGIA

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1996). See also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government
Law: A Reflection on Thirty Surveys, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1994).
2. For perspective on the law of Georgia municipal annexation, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
The Law of MunicipalAnnexation in Georgia: The Evolution of a Concept?, 2 GA. L. REV.
35 (1967); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Annexation in Georgia:Nay-Sayers Beware, 5
GA. L. REV. 499 (1971); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Annexation in Georgia: The
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The latter method, as authorized by general statutes, encompasses three
systems, each of which operates upon an expression of (some degree of)
the annexed subjects' consent.3 Whether a municipality can contract
away its annexation power under the second method remained, prior to
1998, an unresolved issue.

City of Centerville v. City of Warner Robins4 featured a 1995 "consent

order"5 describing exclusive water and sewer service areas of two
neighboring municipalities.' The order also purported to estop each city
from considering petitions or requests for annexation of territory within
the other's service area.7 Sustaining enforcement of that order,' a
majority of the Georgia Supreme Court denied that the trial court
usurped "for itself control over the legislative function of annexation."9
Nothing prevented the two municipalities from covenanting not to
exercise their annexation authority,10 the court reasoned, and "the
superior court merely enforced that agreement."1'

Contiguity Conundrum, 9 GA. L. REV. 167 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal DeAnnexation in Georgia: The Ins and the Outs, 27 GA. ST. B.J. 118 (1991).
3. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-1-22 (1993) ("100% method"); O.C.G.A. § 36-36-30-40(1996) ("60%
method"); O.C.G.A. § 36-36-50-61 (1996) ("resolution of intent method").
4. 270 Ga. 183, 508 S.E.2d 161 (1998).
5. "Both parties were in agreement with the terms of the order, and both parties
expressed a desire that the court enter the order and thereby bring an end to the
controversy. Accordingly, for these reasons, we agree with the superior court that the 1995
Order was a consent order." Id. at 184-85, 508 S.E.2d at 164.
6. The order described the exclusive service area of one municipality by metes and
bounds; although the order provided no such description for the other municipality, the
court held it to "indicate a mutual intention that [both municipalities] were to be assigned
exclusive service areas." Id. at 186, 508 S.E.2d at 165.
7. "Furthermore, both municipalities were estopped from 'entertain[ing], accept[ing],
or approv[ing] of an annexation petition or request which includes territory or property
within the water or sewer service area of the other party.'" Id.
at 183, 508 S.E.2d at 163.
8. Plaintiff municipality had sued to enjoin defendant municipality from violating the
1995 order, and the trial court permanently enjoined defendant from providing water and
sewer services in plaintiff's service area; the court also enjoined defendant from annexing
any of the property contained in plaintiffs exclusive service area. Id.
9. Id. at 185, 508 S.E.2d at 164. Defendant municipality had maintained that "the
power of annexation is a legislative function that is not subject to control by the judiciary."
Id.
10. "Having been granted these powers, nothing prevented [the municipalities] from
covenanting in the 1995 Consent Order not to exercise them." Id. at 185 n.8, 508 S.E.2d
at 164 n.8.
11. Id. at 185, 508 S.E.2d at 164. The court was careful to emphasize that neither the
consent order nor the trial court's order of enforcement "have any impact whatsoever on
the General Assembly's plenary authority to annex municipal property." Id. at 185 n.8, 508
S.E.2d at 164 n.8.
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Officers and Employees

Compensation, compensation incentives, and retirement benefits all
featured prominently in litigation emanating from municipal officers and
employees during the survey period. In Angel v. Hart,2 the court of
appeals rejected complaints by three police officers who, when returned
to regular patrol, lost the ten percent pay increases they enjoyed while
working in the force's special investigation unit. 13 Evidence indicated
"that the temporary nature of the pay increases was understood or at
least implied," 4 and the reductions thus violated no "charter or
ordinance allowing demotions only for cause."" Plaintiffs' substantive
due process position fared no better: "'[An employee with a property
right in employment is protected only by the procedural component of
the Due Process Clause, not its substantive component.""'
The compensation incentive ordinance featured in Columbus Consolidated Government v. Schmidt 7 rewarded employees who attained a
college degree.'. Affording the ordinance a "plain meaning" construction,' 9 the supreme court limited its application "only to employees who
attained their degree after the ordinance's effective date." °

A forceful dissenting opinion for two justices took direct issue with the majority:
"[Defendant municipality] has no power to agree that it will not annex property and,
consequently, the superior court does not have the power to enjoin annexation by
[defendant], whether by consent or otherwise." Id. at 187, 508 S.E.2d 166 (Carley, J.,
dissenting). Further, the dissent asserted, "[n]othing in the statutes by which the General
Assembly has delegated its legislative annexation power... can be construed to permit a
municipality to relinquish its authority to [annex] property even by the terms of an

agreement with another municipality."

Id. at 188, 508 S.E.2d at 166 (Carley, J.,

dissenting).

12. 232 Ga. App. 222, 501 S.E.2d 594 (1998).
13. Id. at 224, 501 S.E.2d at 596.
14. Id. at 223, 501 S.E.2d at 596. "The captain of SIU testified that he told all new
assignees the pay increase lasted only as long as the assignment." Id.
15. Id. "O.C.G.A. § 36-34-2(2) gave the city the power to define and alter the
compensation of city employees." Id.

16. Id. at 224, 501 S.E.2d at 596 (quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th
Cir. 1994)). "Itwas not error to hold the Fourteenth Amendment afforded the officers no
substantive due process protection for their state employment." Id., 501 S.E.2d at 596-97.
17. 269 Ga. 723, 507 S.E.2d 435 (1998).
18. Plaintiff employees sought mandamus to apply the incentive pay to educational
degrees attained prior to the ordinance's effective date. Id. at 723, 507 S.E.2d at 435.
19. The court reasoned that "the ordinance fails to state that it shall apply to degrees
attained prior to its effective date and laws generally apply prospectively." Id. at 724, 507
S.E.2d at 436.
20. Id.
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The court likewise declared "unambiguous" the municipal retirement
ordinance of Strickland v. City of Albany,2 an ordinance distinguishing
between the spouses of retired and non-retired city employees. 22 The
surviving spouse of a retired employee could continue to receive benefits
upon remarriage, an option not available for the surviving spouses of
non-retired employees. 23 Rejecting a claim of unconstitutional classification, the court asserted that plaintiff knew the terms of the retirement
plan before her remarriage and suffered no due process violation. 24 As
for equal protection, the court found "a rational basis for affording
retired City employees and their spouses additional or more attractive
25
pension options than non-retired City employees and their spouses."
C. Legislation
It is a legislative adage that municipal "laws" in conflict with state
"laws" are generally ineffective. Affording context for that adage, Allen
v. City of Atlanta2" focused upon the following "work rule" of a municipal police department: "A firearm shall not be discharged if the lives of
innocent persons may be in danger."27 Contrasting that rule with the
state "self defense" 2' and "arrest"29 statutes, the court of appeals

21. 270 Ga. 31, 504 S.E.2d 666 (1998).
22. Id. at 32, 504 S.E.2d at 667. "The Plan unambiguously provides that, because her
husband was not a retired City employee at the time of his death, [plaintiffs] benefits
would terminate upon her remarriage." Id.
23. The surviving spouse of a non-retired city employee received benefits until her own
death or remarriage. A retired employee could elect "ajoint and survivor annuity which
would pay him a lesser pension but, upon his death, would continue to pay benefits to his
widow without regard to her remarriage." Id. at 31, 504 S.E.2d at 667.
24. Id. at 32, 504 S.E.2d at 667. "Because [plaintiff! never had any property right in
post-remarriage benefits under the Plan, the termination of payments upon her remarriage
would not constitute a violation of due process." Id.
25. Id., 504 S.E.2d at 668. "Generally, retired employees have worked longer, have
contributed more to the Plan and are older individuals with shorter life expectancies than
non-retired employees." Id. Moreover, the court concluded, "O.C.G.A. § 47-5-40(c)
authorizes 'reasonable' classifications in municipal pension plans." Id. at 33, 504 S.E.2d
668.
26. 235 Ga. App. 516, 510 S.E.2d 64 (1998).
27. Id. at 516, 510 S.E.2d at 65. The municipality relied upon this rule to suspend a
police officer who attempted to investigate a parked vehicle containing two persons. The
driver started the vehicle and drove toward the officer. "As the vehicle came at him, [the
officer] fired a shot from his gun into the driver's side window. The shot hit the driver and
grazed the person sitting in the passenger seat." Id.
28. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) (1999).
29. Id. § 17-4-20(b) (1997).
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perceived an impasse.3 Neither statute "automatically prohibits the
discharge of a firearm if the lives of innocent people may be in danger;"3 the municipal rule, however, "creates such a mandatory prohibition." 2 Under the statutes, "the presence of a bystander at a crime or
arrest scene does not override all other considerations;""3 contrarily, the
rule's "mandatory language... would lead to such a result." 4 Accordingly, the court declared the department rule in conflict with state
statutes and invalidated a police officer's suspension for its violation. 3
D.

Elections

The survey period presented two failed efforts at invalidating
municipal elections. Hendry v. Smith36 featured the contest of a
mayor's election, the challenger charging the incumbent with vote
solicitation at the polling place." The supreme court found no evidence
that the mayor's conduct in and around city hall violated election
statutes.3 ' Additionally, none of the incumbent's actions "in any way
placed the result of the election in doubt." 9

30. The state self-defense statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), permits a person's use of
deadly force "only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death
or great bodily injury to himself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible
felony." The statute expressly prohibits conflicting local government legislation. The state
arrest statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(b), permits an officer's use of deadly force 'when the
officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses an immediate threat of physical violence
to the officer or others." This statute expressly prohibits conflicting local government
legislation.
31. 235 Ga. App. at 517, 510 S.E.2d at 66.
32. Id. The court asserted that the rule "does not allow for any exercise of judgment
of an officer faced with a self-defense or arrest situation in which the discharge of a gun
might endanger innocent bystanders." Id.
33. Id. at 518, 510 S.E.2d at 66.
34. Id. The court emphasized that it had no quarrel with the rule's purpose of ensuring
the safety of innocent bystanders; '[rather, it is the mandatory language of the rule that
is problematic." Id.
35. Id., 510 S.E.2d at 67. "ITihe suspension of [the officer] based on the charged
violation of that rule cannot stand." Id.
36. 270 Ga. 17, 505 S.E.2d 216 (1998).
37. Id. at 17-18, 505 S.E.2d at 217. While the polls were open, the mayor went twice
to speak with the poll manager, shook hands and spoke briefly with a departing voter, and
spoke with a police office and two other acquaintances outside the building. Id.
38. Id. at 18, 505 S.E.2d at 217-18. "Election returns are presumed to be valid and it
is the burden of the party contesting the election to show irregularity or illegality sufficient
to place the result of the election in doubt." Id., 505 S.E.2d at 217 (citing Streeter v.
Paschal, 267 Ga. 207, 208, 476 S.E.2d 759, 760 (1996)).
39. Id., 505 S.E.2d at 217-18. The incumbent won the election by a margin of 91 votes.
Id. at 17, 505 S.E.2d at 217.
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The court reached the same result in Hunt v. Crawford,4 ° a challenge
by a candidate who lost a city council election by a margin of ten votes.
Although conceding misconduct on the part of the winner's poll watcher
in checking lists of voters, 41 the court carefully reviewed the evidence.42 "[Tihere is no evidence in the record that any more than seven
votes could have been affected by the alleged misconduct, and thus no
placed in doubt the
evidence to demonstrate
43 that the alleged misconduct
result of the election."
E. Contracts
The period's most striking municipal contract controversy arose in a
case previously observed from another perspective: 4 City of Centerville v. City of Warner Robins.4' The alleged contract appeared in what4
the Georgia Supreme Court variously termed both a "consent order" 1
and a "consent judgment"47-a superior court's 1995 order concerning

40. 270 Ga. 7, 507 S.E.2d 723 (1998).
41. The poll watcher testified that he had checked the voters' list and reported to the
election winner the names of supporters who had voted. O.C.G.A. § 21-3-317(c) prohibits
election officers from "'talking to voters, checking lists of electors, or participating in any
other form of campaigning.'" 270 Ga. at 7, 507 S.E.2d at 725 (O.C.G.A. § 21-3-317 was
repealed effective January 1, 1999).
42. Defendant admitted making telephone calls to six voters from the list her poll
watcher supplied and "the evidence introduced at trial concerned twelve potential voters."
Id. at 8, 507 S.E.2d at 725. Working through the evidence as to each potential voter, the
court concluded that plaintiff "only demonstrated that seven votes at most ought to be
nullified." Id. at 10, 507 S.E.2d at 726. Finally, "there was no evidence... from which it
can be inferred that the alleged misconduct was more widespread than the record
indicates." Id.
43. Id. at 10, 507 S.E.2d at 727. "The setting aside of an election in which the people
have chosen their representative is a drastic remedy that should not be undertaken
lightly." Id.
44. See the discussion under the topic, "Annexation," supra,or text accompanying supra
notes 2-11.
45. 270 Ga. 183, 508 S.E.2d 161 (1998).
46. [T]he superior court properly treated the 1995 Order as a consent
judgment ....A consent judgment is one entered into by stipulation of
the parties with the intention of resolving a dispute, and generally is
brought to the court by the parties so that it may be entered by the court,
thereby compromising and settling an action. The voluntary nature of a
consent judgment is among its most notable characteristics.
Id. at 184, 508 S.E.2d at 163-64.
47. "Both parties were in agreement with the terms of the order, and both parties
expressed a desire that the court enter the order and thereby bring an end to the
controversy. Accordingly, for these reasons, we agree with the superior court that the 1995
Order was a consent order." Id. at 184-85, 508 S.E.2d at 164.

1999]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

403

two neighboring municipalities." In that order, the two governments
purported to agree upon their exclusive water and sewer service
areas; 49 each municipality also agreed not to annex territory within the
other's area. ° Some three years later, following disagreement between
the two cities, the superior court permanently enjoined defendant from
providing water and sewer service,51 and from annexing territory,52 in
plaintiff's exclusive service area.
Upon defendant municipality's appeal to the supreme court, a majority
of the justices found no obstacle to the cities' annexation covenant, 53
nor to its enforcement by the superior court. 4 It was left to a twojustice dissenting opinion to emphasize the distinctive legal realm
occupied by municipal contracts. 5 Many of those contracts fall subject
to historic statutory mandate: "One council may not, by an ordinance,
bind itself or its successors so as to prevent free legislation in matters
This condemnation fully applies to
of municipal government.""6

48. "The 1995 Consent Order was drafted and presented to the superior court by
attorneys for (defendant municipality], and its contents were consented to by [plaintiff
municipality's] counsel." Id. at 183, 508 S.E.2d at 163.
49. "Additionally, the 1995 Consent Order provided... that neither municipality could
provide [water and sewer] services to areas within the exclusive area of the other
municipality without first obtaining written consent." Id.
50. "Furthermore, both municipalities were estopped from 'entertain[ing], accept[ing],
or approv[ing] of an annexation petition or request which includes territory or property
within the water or sewer service area of the other party.'" Id.
51. This 1998 action ("the 1998 Order") was taken by the same superior court judge
who entered the 1995 order. "The 1998 Order permanently enjoined [defendant
municipality] from proceeding with its plan to provide water and sewer service [in plaintiff
municipality's area]." Id. at 184, 508 S.E.2d at 163.
52. "In March 1998, the 1998 Order was amended on motion for clarification to also
enjoin [defendant municipality] from annexing any of the property contained in [plaintiff
municipality's] exclusive service area." Id.
53. The court expressly rejected defendant municipality's argument that "the power of
annexation is a legislative function that is not subject to control by the judiciary" as
misplaced: "However, the superior court in this matter did not seek to usurp for itself
control over the legislative function of annexation." Id. at 185, 508 S.E.2d at 164.
54. Id. "In plain terms, [defendant municipality] agreed in the 1995 Consent Order not
to seek the annexation of property that rightfully was within [plaintiff municipality's]
service area, and the superior court merely enforced that agreement in its 1998 Order."
Id.
55. Id. at 187-88, 508 S.E.2d at 166 (Carley, J., dissenting).
56. O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3(a) (1993). For background on this mandate, see R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Local Government and Contracts that Bind, 3 GA. L. REV. 546 (1969); R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Binding Contracts in Georgia Local Government Law: Recent Perspectives, 11 GA. ST.
B.J. 148 (1975); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contractsin GeorgiaLocal Government Law:
Configurations of Codification, 24 GA. L. REV. 95 (1989); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding
Contracts in County Government-Never Mind, GA. COUNTY GOV'T MAG. 28 (Mar. 1991).
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contracts as well as ordinances; it covers governmental or legislative
endeavors; it reaches covenants between local governments; its violation
yields an ultra vires nullity; that nullity is subject to neither estoppel
nor ratification. 7
Putting principles to facts,5" the dissent declared it "fundamental
that a city council cannot deprive or restrict itself or its successors in the
exercise of its annexation power by entering into a contract or agreement
purporting to limit its authority to annex.""9 Accordingly, the dissent
deemed the consent order "ultra vires," "null," and "void,"0 and held
defendant municipality free to assert "the invalidity, ab initio, of its
alleged agreement not to annex.""'
Georgia holds historic commitment to its statutory.(and common law)
invalidation of a local government's attempt to bind itself in the future
performance of its governmental functions. Does that commitment
nullify a municipality's effort to bind itself in the future performance of
its governmental function of annexation? In City of Centerville v. City
of Warner Robins,"2 two dissenting justices crafted a serious analysis
of nullification.
In failing even to acknowledge-much less address-that analysis, a majority of the Georgia Supreme Court displayed
an unbecoming aloofness to an issue of crucial significance in local
government law.
F

Powers

Municipal power challenges arose in two governmental contexts, and
both challenges proved successful. Monticello, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta 3
featured a municipal assessment of solid waste disposal fees, on a per
unit basis, against unoccupied and uninhabitable apartments." The

57. Id.
58. "Thus, an agreement between two municipalities for each to refrain from accepting
annexation petitions without the consent of the other is null and void." 270 Ga. at 188, 508
S.E.2d at 166 (Carley, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 188-89, 508 S.E.2d at 166 (Carley, J., dissenting).
60. Id., 508 S.E.2d at 166-67.
61. Id. at 189, 508 S.E.2d at 167. "The annexation power is strictly legislative ....
Neither municipality is estopped from challenging the legality of such an agreement." Id.
at 188, 508 S.E.2d at 166 (Carley, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent argued,
"[defendant's] agreement not to annex property is not rendered valid merely because of its
inclusion in a consent order regarding water service areas." Id. at 189, 508 S.E.2d at 167.
62. 270 Ga. 183, 508 S.E.2d 161 (1998).

63. 231 Ga. App. 382, 499 S.E.2d 157 (1998).
64. Plaintiff argued as follows:
Since 1990, the City ...has assessed a fee against the property for each of the

224 units for the removal and disposal of solid waste or trash from the units.
Because 134 of the 224 units have been unoccupied since 1990, no solid waste or
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court of appeals reviewed the city's charter by distinguishing between
"taxes" and "fees," 5 by adopting an "in pari materia" interpretation,6
by subjugating home rule ordinances to inconsistent charter provisions,67 and by strictly construing municipal power grants." Clearly,
the material charter authorization "contemplates assessment of a fee
only against occupied premises," 9 and not "individual apartment units
which are neither occupied nor habitable."7 ° Finally, the court rejected
the city's justification of mere availability,7 "an inchoate
opportunity
72
to take advantage of the service at some future date."
In City of Duluth v. Riverbrooke Properties,Inc.,7 the court thwarted
a municipal requirement that a developer file an "as built" survey for a
subdivision lake which the city characterized as a surface water runoff

trash was attributable to these units.
Id. at 382, 499 S.E.2d at 158.
65. The court held that charter power "'to prescribe what should constitute a lot for
sanitary purposes and assessment' and allowing assessments to be made on vacant lots for
tax purposes therefore does not apply to the assessment of fees for the collection of solid
waste." Id. at 385, 499 S.E.2d at 160.
66. "'[A]ll statutes relating to the same subject-matter, briefly called statutes "in pari
materia," are construed together, and harmonized wherever possible, so as to ascertain the
legislative intendment and give effect thereto.'" Id. at 383, 499 S.E.2d at 159 (quoting
Bennett v. Wood, 188 Ga. App. 630, 632, 373 S.E.2d 645 (1988)). For perspective on the
statutory construction maxim, "in pari materia," as applied by the Georgia courts, see
Statutory Construction in Georgia:The Doctrine of In Pari Materia,in R. PERRY SENTELL,
JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA STATUTORY LAW 259 (1997).
67. "Under O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(a), municipal corporations have the power to adopt only
'clearly reasonable ordinances, resolutions, or regulations ... for which no provision has
been made by general law and which are not inconsistent with the Constitution or any
charter provision applicable thereto.' Municipal ordinances inconsistent with a city's
charter are invalid." 231 Ga. App. at 384, 499 S.E.2d at 159. For a complete treatment
of home rule in Georgia local government law, including this "first-tier" delegation of
power, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Home Rule System, 50 MERCER L. REV. 99
(1998).
68. "A grant of power to a municipal corporation must be strictly construed, and any
reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the
municipal corporation." 231 Ga. App. at 384, 499 S.E.2d at 159. For discussion of the
continued applicability of this "Dillon's Rule" formulation in Georgia, see R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., The Georgia Home Rule System, 50 MERCER L. REV. 99 (1998).
69. 231 Ga. App. at 385, 499 S.E.2d at 160. "The payment of the fee and the removal
of waste are expressed in conjunctive rather than disjunctive language, thus requiring that
waste be actually removed from the premises in question." Id. at 386, 499 S.E.2d at 160.
70. Id. at 387, 499 S.E.2d at 162.
71. "The city contends that [plaintiff] receives a benefit from the mere availability of
solid waste disposal service." Id. at 386, 499 S.E.2d at 161.
72. Id. at 387, 499 S.E.2d at 162. The court thus reversed the trial judge's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the municipality. Id. at 389-90, 499 S.E.2d at 163.
73. 233 Ga. App. 46, 502 S.E.2d 806 (1998).
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detention facility.74 Surveying the controversy's "complex facts," the
court held defendant's water detention facilities in compliance with
regulations 5 effective when its plans were approved.7" Additionally,
the court invoked the doctrine of municipal estoppel: 77 The city
delegated discretion to its planning director, and the director "chose not
to require the 'as-built' survey and certification before the final plan was
approved and the occupancy permits issued."7 Accordingly, "such acts
or omissions ...

were not the exercise of an ultra vires act, but the

exercise by the Director of discretionary
delegated police powers of the
79
City within the scope of his authority."

G. Regulation
A number of challenged power exercises assumed a municipal
regulatory focus-generally, regulation prevailed over challenge.8 0

74. Id. at 51-53, 502 S.E.2d at 811-12. The problem arose when water backed up in a
culvert carrying water runoff into the lake at a point already accepted by the city as a city
street. The "as-built" survey demand "was a way to force [developer] to correct the problem
to the satisfaction of the City's engineers, because the defendants would have to obtain the
approval of such 'as-built' survey and certification from the City." Id. at 49, 502 S.E.2d at
809.
75. "Thus, the defendants acquired vested property rights under the preliminary
developmental plan filed under the 1971 Regulations and, as a matter of law, such vested
rights in the entire Riverbrooke Subdivision were 'grandfathered' from the effect of the
subsequently adopted 1992 Regulations." Id.
at 51, 502 S.E.2d at 811.
76. Id. at 53, 502 S.E.2d at 812. The city "approved the final plat of the completed
Riverbrooke Subdivision submitted by the defendants and issued certificates of occupancy
for the completed residential units. No 'as-built' survey and certification of the lake was
filed by the defendants.. .; however, the City approved the plans and occupancy permits
nonetheless." Id. at 48, 502 S.E.2d at 809.
77. The court observed that generally "estoppel ... would not arise to frustrate a
governmental function publicly expressed by the plain language of the ordinance
prohibiting an act or omission, in this case, however, the governmental policy was not
frustrated but was furthered by the acts or omissions of the Director. . . ." Id. at 54, 502
S.E.2d at 813. For treatment of estoppel as it applies in Georgia local government law, see
R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW
(1985).

78. 233 Ga. App. at 54, 502 S.E.2d at 813. "While we have held that the 1992
Regulations are not applicable, the Director believed that he had the power to enforce
them," and chose not to do so. Id.
79. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's denial of relief to the municipality.
Id.
80. For treatment of the municipal regulatory power in an assortment of litigated
contexts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L.
REV. 614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in
Georgia Local Government Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 115 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government Law and Liquor Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REV. 1039 (1981);
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Whipple v. City of Cordeles l presented plaintiff's attack upon a prohibition against keeping horses inside city limits. Plaintiff alleged municipal
adoption of that ordinance only after she confirmed the absence of such
prohibitions and expended funds for the purpose. 2 Retroactivity found
little favor with the court of appeals: "[Plaintiff] did not acquire a
'vested right' to keep horses on her property merely because no law then
prohibited her from doing so. " 3 Indeed, "[tihe passage of an ordinance
that applied in general to all city residents certainly created no such
'vested right,' nor did her communications with the city attorney, who
merely informed her correctly of existing law."s '
The power's regulatory nature saved the monetary imposition
challenged in Hadley v. City of Atlanta," an annual renewal charge
upon taxicab holders of "Certificates of Public Necessity and Convenience." 6 Reviewing charges of invalid taxation, 7 the court directed

inquiry to "whether the ordinance operates merely as a means to
generate revenue or whether it acts effectively as a precondition, or
license, for engaging in the occupation."88 The various investigations
and inspections performed by the city taxicab bureau 9 confirmed the

presence of "actual regulatory services."9 ° Additionally, "monies at
least equal to those collected as ... renewal fees are given to the Bureau
and used to defray the actual cost of the regulatory activities with which

R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Ascertainable Standards" vs. "Unbridled Discretion" in Local
Government Regulation, GA. COUNTY GOV'T MAG. 19 (Dec. 1989).
81.

231 Ga. App. 274, 499 S.E.2d 113 (1998).

82. Plaintiff had checked with the city attorney who informed her that no ordinance
prohibited keeping horses within city limits and, in reliance upon that information, plaintiff
constructed a barn at her residence and expended additional funds on maintenance and
upkeep. Id. at 274, 499 S.E.2d at 115.
83. Id. at 277, 499 S.E.2d at 116. "[Plaintiff] did not make formal or official application
to modify her property; no formal application was required." Id.
84. Id. Thus, the court held, plaintiff possessed no action for constitutional deprivation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and "[flor similar reasons, [plaintiff cannot show inverse
condemnation." Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the municipality. Id. at 277-78, 499 S.E.2d at 117.
85. 232 Ga. App. 871, 502 S.E.2d 784 (1998).
86. The initial cost of a certificate was $6,000. Beginning in 1995, the municipality
imposed an annual "renewal fee" of $150 upon certificate holders. Id. at 871, 502 S.E.2d
at 786.
87. The court noted the city's authority to impose regulatory fees upon taxicabs in
O.C.G.A. § 48-13-9. 232 Ga. App. at 872, 502 S.E.2d at 786.
88. Id.
89. The bureau investigated all taxicab companies, checked all drivers, and bi-annually
inspected all vehicles. Id. at 872-73, 502 S.E.2d at 786-87.
90. 232 Ga. App. at 874, 502 S.E.2d at 787.
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it is charged."9 1 As for the city's imposition of several fees upon one
occupation, "[s]everal regulatory activities are involved,"92 and so long
as the "fees approximate the regulatory costs involved, they are
appropriate and lawful."93

In Chamblee Visuals, LLC v. City of Chamblee,94 plaintiff protested

municipal denial of a permit to build a new store.95 Sustaining the
validity of the applicable city ordinance," the supreme court held that
neither "nuisance" nor "unlawful purpose" constituted vague or
overbroad standards.9" Further, the court concluded, a denial on
grounds of plaintiff's intent to violate a criminal statute did not amount
to "a prior restraint in violation of the state constitutional right to free
speech."'s

91. Id. at 873, 502 S.E.2d at 787.
92. Id. at 875, 502 S.E.2d at 788.
93. Id. Again, the court distinguished taxation:
When a tax to engage in a general business is exacted, another tax may not be
imposed upon the doing of a particular portion of the business already taxed. But
the purpose of fees is not to raise revenue; it is to cover the cost of regulating
certain activities for the protection of the public.
Id.
94. 270 Ga. 33, 506 S.E.2d 113 (1998).
95. Id. at 33, 506 S.E.2d at 114.
96. The ordinance permitted denial if the premises would constitute a nuisance or be
used for an unlawful purpose. Id.
at 34, 506 S.E.2d at 114.
97. Id. "The word "nuisance" has a definite and determined meaning in the law, and
is not indefinite, vague, or uncertain.'" Id. (quoting Newman v. Sessions, 215 Ga. 54, 55,
108 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1959)). "An 'unlawful purpose' clearly includes 'a purpose to violate
a criminal law.'" Id. (quoting Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 870, 178 S.E.2d 189, 190
(1970)).
98. Id., 506 S.E.2d at 115. The city denied the permit because plaintiff intended to
violate O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80(c): "Any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for
the stimulation of human genital organs is obscene material." Id. The court also rejected
plaintiff's due process argument: "Visuals freely presented evidence and made statements
in support of its application. In an administrative or quasi-judicial proceeding, due process
requires only an informal hearing, not strict adherence to the rules of evidence." Id. at 35,
506 S.E.2d at 115. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's decision in favor of the
municipality. Id., 506 S.E.2d at 116.
In Burton v. Campbell, 270 Ga. 564, 512 S.E.2d 889 (1999), plaintiffs store possessed a
beer and wine license by virtue of a grandfather clause in the city ordinance relating to
distance requirements. Id. at 564, 512 S.E,2d at 889. Under this clause, the supreme
court held, plaintiff was entitled to a renewal of his beer and wine license but not to the
issuance of a distilled spirits license. Id. "As the sale of distilled spirits is a nongrandfathered privilege which [plaintiff] must assert in his own right, his application for
such a license remains subject to the distance requirements." Id. at 564-65, 512 S.E.2d at
890.
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Property

The survey period caught the supreme court in its historic role of
mediator over municipal alleys. Hale v. City of Statham" displayed a
dispute over municipal acceptance of land expressly dedicated as a
public alley but never used by the public nor maintained by the city. °°
Reviewing the municipality's evidence that it had removed the property
from tax rolls,' 1 the court held that "a tax map is insufficient as a
matter of law to manifest acceptance."' 2
Finding acceptance "a
disputed issue of fact,"0 3 the court reversed a summary judgment for
the city.'04
I.

Liability

Claimants' efforts at surmounting municipal tort immunity continued
apace during the survey period.' 5 Several episodes focused upon a
traditional exception to immunity-that of street and sidewalk defects.'06
Plaintiff motorist in McKinley v. City of Cartersville17
sought to press that exception into service for injuries allegedly caused
by an inadequate stop sign.'0 8 Refusing to extend theory to facts,
however, the court of appeals held the street defect statute 9 limited

99. 269 Ga. 817, 504 S.E.2d 691 (1998).
100. Plaintiff property owners sought to enjoin the city from opening the contested
alley. Id. at 817-18, 504 S.E.2d at 692. The court found an express dedication of the land
from the fact that the original owner's recorded subdivision plat showed the alley's
existence. Id. at 818, 504 S.E.2d at 692.
101. "The city claims acceptance based on its failure to tax the property." Id. at 819,
504 S.E.2d at 693.
102. Id. The court termed taxation exemption "one factor to consider in determining
whether a government has exercised control over property." Id.
103. Id. Plaintiffs "presented an affidavit and photographs asserting that the public
never used the alley as a passageway and the city never maintained the alley." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. For orientation, perspective, and general chronology on municipal liability
(immunity), see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN
GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government Tort Liability: The
"Crisis" Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 18 (1985); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
106. This exception is one of historic origin, now codified in O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93. For
treatment, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA
62-116 (4th ed. 1988).
107. 232 Ga. App. 659, 503 S.E.2d 559 (1998).
108. Id. at 659, 503 S.E.2d at 559. Plaintiff alleged that the municipality's failure to
erect an appropriate stop sign at the specified intersection constituted a street "defect"
within the meaning of the above statute. Id., 503 S.E.2d at 560.
109. O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) (1996).
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to the "physical condition" of the streets themselves." So restricted,
the statute failed to reach "the regulation of traffic.""'
The second episode pointed out the tension between street defect
liability1 2 and the immunity provided by Georgia's

Recreational

Property Act.'13 Plaintiff in City of 7Tbee Island v. Godinho114 sued for
injuries suffered from a fall on a city sidewalk adjacent to the stateowned beach." 5 Reversing the court of appeals," 6 the supreme court
declared municipal immunity for recreational property."7 First, the
court read the Act's "plain language" to include a sidewalk which only
provided access to recreational property owned by another."' Second,
the court deemed it immaterial that some sidewalk users may spend
money at city businesses:" 9 "[T]he City is not in the business of
entertainment or recreation
and does not seek to make a profit from the
120
use of the sidewalk."

Woodall v. City of Villa Rica 12' also featured injuries resulting from
alleged sidewalk defects, but the case turned upon compliance with the

110. 232 Ga. App. at 660, 503 S.E.2d at 560. "The reference to 'defects' in the Code
section refers to the physical condition of the street itself; it includes defects brought about
by the forces of nature and by persons and which render the street unsafe and includes
objects adjacent to and suspended over the street." Id.
111. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's award of summary judgment for the
municipality. Id.
112. O.CG.A. § 32-4-93 (1996).
113. Id. § 51-3-20 to -26 (1981).
114. 270 Ga. 567, 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999).
115. Id. at 567, 511 S.E.2d at 518. Plaintiff fell on a broken section of pavement. "The
sidewalk ran adjacent to a large parking lot on one side and to the beach on the other
side." Id.
116. Godinho v. City of Tybee Island, 231 Ga. App. 377, 499 S.E.2d 389 (1998).
117. 270 Ga. at 569, 511 S.E.2d at 519.
118. Id. at 568, 511 S.E.2d at 518. "Moreover, to exclude coverage in these
circumstances might encourage people not to provide access to their property for the
purpose of permitting people to enjoy property owned by others, and thus would defeat the
very purpose of the [Recreational Property Act]." Id., 511 S.E.2d at 518-19.
119. The court reasoned that "although there is some evidence in the record from which
it can be inferred that the City might receive an indirect financial benefit from the
sidewalk, we conclude that.., this evidence is insufficient to take the sidewalk outside the
protection of the RPA." Id.
at 569, 511 S.E.2d at 519.
120. Id. The court also rejected plaintiffs position that the Recreational Property Act
was in conflict with the sidewalk defect statute: "Simply stated, the RPA will control when
the sidewalk is used for a 'recreational purpose' and the other requirements of the RPA are
satisfied, and § 32-4-93 [the street defect statute] will apply in other cases." Id.
121. 236 Ga. App. 788, 513 S.E.2d 525 (1999).

19991

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

411

"ante litem" notice statute. 122 Emphasizing the statute's requirement
that plaintiff's claim "shall be submitted for adjustment,"123 the court
of appeals disqualified a letter of general complaints. 124 "The bare
mention of plaintiff's arm needing surgery after she tripped on uneven
concrete," 125 buried amid numerous other observations on municipal
deficiencies, was insufficient "to put a reasonable recipient on notice that
the injury specified will " be
pursued as a claim for money damages
against the municipality. 126
Yet another statute127 governed Pearson v. City of Atlanta,12' an
action for a decedent struck by a suspect fleeing municipal police
pursuit. 129 Under a 1995 enactment, the city's liability pivoted upon
whether "'the law enforcement officer acted with reckless disregardfor
proper law enforcement procedures in the officer's decision to initiate 131
or
continue the pursuit.'"'3 ° Reviewing uncontroverted testimony,
the court of appeals found no evidence of a failure to "balance the risks

122. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (1993). For treatment of this statute, its history, and its
application in cases, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY
IN GEORGIA 145-74 (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Municipal Tort Liability:
Ante Litem Notice, 4 GA. L. REV. 134 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Ante Litem Notice: Cause
for Pause, URB. GA. MAG. 24 (Oct. 1978).

123. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (1993).
124. 236 Ga. App. at 790, 513 S.E.2d at 527. Plaintiffs son had written the letter to
the city council and manager, referring to a prior letter complaining of generally poor
sidewalks, instances of poor zoning ordinances, the absence of building requirements, and
the responsiveness of elected officials to property owners. Id. at 788-89, 513 S.E.2d at 526.
125. Id. at 789-90, 513 S.E.2d at 527.
126. Id. at 790, 513 S.E.2d at 527. The court thus affirmed summary judgment for the
municipality. Id.
127. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 (1997).
128.

231 Ga. App. 96, 499 S.E.2d 89 (1998).

129. Id. at 97,499 S.E.2d at 91. Plaintiff's decedent was killed when his car was struck
by the car of a suspect attempting to elude a city police officer in a high speed chase during
evening rush hour traffic. Id.
130. Id. at 98, 499 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)). This statute "has
promulgated a reckless disregard standard rather than a standard of mere negligence."
Id., 499 S.E.2d at 92.
131. The officer testified to "actions of slowing before going through a red light,
exceeding the speed limit during light or non-existent traffic, and disregarding regulations
governing direction of traffic movement when oncoming traffic was light or non-existent."
Id.
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inherent in the pursuit."" 2 Thus, plaintiff had failed to show' that
the
13 3
disregard.
'reckless
of
level
the
to
arose
ever
"conduct
officer's
Assertedly deficient law enforcement also accounted for Dybas v. Town
of Chester,14 an alleged municipal failure to prevent unlicensed
children from driving on public roads. 135 Rejecting plaintiff's action
for the death of her husband, the court reasoned that "where failure to
provide police protection is alleged, there can be no liability based on a
municipality's duty to protect the general public."" 6 The court also
rebuffed plaintiff's efforts to avoid the "public duty" doctrine by showing
a "special relationship."'
"[Nleither she nor her husband ever
justifiably
or
detrimentally
relied
on any affirmative undertaking by the
" 138
town.

Several cases featured "nuisance" attempts to escape from municipal
tort immunity.3 9 The tactic succeeded in Queen v. City of Douglasville,'140 an action on behalf of two small girls struck by a train while
attending the city's Fourth-of-July parade.' 4 ' Reversing the municipal-

132. Id. "Additionally ....pursuit did not commence until after the suspect's vehicle
suddenly began to accelerate and [the officer] thereafter activated his siren and lights."
Id. at 98-99, 499 S.E.2d at 92. Thus, "the danger to the public had commenced before a
pursuit was initiated." Id. at 99, 499 S.E.2d at 92.
133. Id. at 98, 499 S.E.2d at 92. The court thus affirmed summary judgment for the
municipality. Id. at 101, 499 S.E.2d at 94.
134. 234 Ga. App. 113, 505 S.E.2d 274 (1998).
135. Plaintiffs 89-year-old husband "was walking on the right-hand side of the road
when a car driven by [a] 13-year-old [driver] struck and killed him." Id. at 113, 505 S.E.2d
at 275.
136. Id. (quoting City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 28, 426 S.E.2d 861, 863 (1993)).
137. Plaintiff "argues that the town can still be found liable for negligence under the
'special duty' exception to the public duty doctrine because a special relationship existed
between [her husband] and the town such that the town owed a special duty to him." Id.
at 114, 505 S.E.2d at 275.
138. Id. at 114-15, 505 S.E.2d at 276. The court listed the three requirements for
establishing the "special relationship" exception: an explicit assurance, knowledge that
inaction would cause harm, and justifiable and detrimental reliance. Id. at 115, 505 S.E.2d
at 276. The court affirmed summary judgment for the municipality. Id.
139. For treatment of nuisance liability in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 117-34 (4th ed. 1988);

R. Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalLiability in Georgia: The "Nuisance"Nuisance, 12 GA. ST.
B.J. 11 (1975); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability:Nuisance orNot?, 43 MERCER
L. REV. 1 (1991).
140. 232 Ga. App. 68,500 S.E.2d 918 (1998) (Georgia Supreme Court reversed this case
in City of Douglasville v. Queen, 270 Ga. 770, 514 S.E.2d 195 (1999)).
141. Id. at 68, 500 S.E.2d at 920. The parade route traditionally employed the city's
main business thoroughfare which was adjacent to the railroad. The girls attended the
parade with their parents and were struck when walking on the railroad tracks "looking
down and talking." Id.
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ity's summary judgment,"' the court of appeals found municipal
misfeasance in holding the parade in the congested area, awareness of
the pedestrian-train congestion in prior years, and that "the dangerous
conditions had been regularly repeated with each year's parade.""
The court reached a similar conclusion in Martin v. City of Fort
Valley,'" a claim for flood damage to plaintiff's property. 45 Emphasizing the Georgia municipality's historic nuisance responsibility,'" the
court relied upon expert testimony that the city's
drainage system, not
47
a state highway, caused the damage in issue.

142. The court reviewed the "guidelines" for determining a municipal nuisance from
City of Bowman v. Gunnells, 243 Ga. 809, 256 S.E.2d 782 (1979): a degree of municipal
misfeasance exceeding mere negligence; a continuous or regularly repetitious condition; and
failure to act within a reasonable time after knowledge of the condition. 232 Ga. App. at
69, 500 S.E.2d at 920.
143. 232 Ga. App. at 69, 500 S.E.2d at 921. "Genuine issues of material fact remain
for resolution by a jury on [plaintiff's] nuisance claim." Id. at 70, 500 S.E.2d at 921. A
majority of the court rejected arguments of "premises liability" and "mantrap," on grounds
that the city was neither the owner nor occupier of the premises on which the accident
occurred. Id. at 70-71, 500 S.E.2d at 922. Three judges dissented to the majority's action
in rejecting those arguments. Id. at 72-73, 500 S.E.2d at 922-23.
144. 235 Ga. App. 20, 508 S.E.2d 244 (1998).
145. Id. at 20, 508 S.E.2d at 244-45. To assist plaintiff with water runoff from a
resurfaced sate highway, city employees had installed a storm sewer. Plaintiff alleged that
his residence and garage "sustained significant damage from the surface water runoff that
discharged from that storm sewer onto his property." Id.
146. "Municipal responsibility for creating or maintaining a nuisance which constitutes
a danger to life and health ...is an established historic principle in Georgia." Id. at 21,
508 S.E.2d at 245.
147. "Itis undisputed that the City built a storm sewer and installed some plastic pipe
to attempt to alleviate the water runoff problem apparently created by a state highway."
Id. The court held that the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment for the
municipality. Id. at 22, 508 S.E.2d at 245.
City of Atlanta v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 231 Ga. App. 206, 498 S.E.2d
782 (1998) also involved an alleged instance of municipal damage to property but in a
completely different context. Id. at 206, 498 S.E.2d at 783. There, the court denied the
city's effort to force an insurance company to defend it against a claim for property damage
caused by a city contractor. Id. at 208, 498 S.E.2d at 785. The alleged intentional wrong
by the city in directing the contractor to clear land it did not own was not an "event" within
coverage of the contractor's insurance policy. Id.
Continuing the theme of different context, Ralston v. City of Dahlonega, 236 Ga. App.
386, 512 S.E.2d 300 (1999) featured an effort by a municipality and the State Department
of Transportation to vacate an arbitrator's award of damages to a property owner under
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6, which provides tort actions for injury to the peace, happiness, or
feelings. Id. at 386, 512 S.E.2d at 301. Rejecting defendants' argument that the award
was one of punitive damages and thus violative of public policy, the court reasoned that
damages under the above statute are in part punitive but also serve to compensate for the
extent of the injury. Id. at 389, 512 S.E.2d at 303. Thus, the court refused to vacate the
arbitrator's award to plaintiff. Id. at 391, 512 S.E.2d at 304.
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Contrarily, the court rejected the nuisance complaint in Roberts v. City
of Macon, 45 that a malfunctioning traffic light caused an intersection
collision. 149 Although plaintiff showed municipal knowledge of the
problem some forty-five minutes prior to her accident, "it is undisputed
that the City repaired the light approximately three hours after the first
alleged report of its malfunction." 5 ° The court affirmed summary
judgment for the municipality. 5 '
Claimants were largely unsuccessful in their "constitutional tort"
endeavors of the period. 152 Whipple v. City of Cordele.53 featured
plaintiff's campaign against a municipal ordinance prohibiting the
keeping of horses inside the city.5 4 Rejecting the claim of unconstitutional retroactivity,'55 the court of appeals found no "deprivation of a
vested right."5 6 "It follows," the court held, "that this deprivation did
not entitle [plaintiff] to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."'
Suffering a similar fate, an inmate in Merritt v. Athens Clarke
County'
tendered an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate
medical care.15 9
Reviewing the paucity of plaintiff's admissible

148. 234 Ga. App. 287, 506 S.E.2d 650 (1998).
149. Id. at 290, 506 S.E.2d at 653. Plaintiff claimed that the traffic light produced a
continuous green light for both streets, resulting in the collision. Id. at 288, 506 S.E.2d at
651.
150. Id. at 290, 506 S.E.2d at 653.
151. Id. "Thus, evidence that [a witness] notified the City approximately 45 minutes
before [plaintiffs] accident does not preclude summary judgment in favor of the City." Id.
152. The "constitutional tort" derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, providing a civil action for government violations of constitutional protections. For
treatment of this statute by both federal and state courts in respect to Georgia local
governments, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW'S ASSIMILATION OF MONELL: SECTION 1983 AND THE NEW "PERSONS" (1984). For an exclusive focus
upon the statute in the Georgia appellate courts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government and ConstitutionalTorts: In the Georgia Courts, 49 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1997).
153. 231 Ga. App. 274, 499 S.E.2d 113 (1998).
154. Id. at 274, 499 S.E.2d at 115. The municipality enacted the ordinance one year
after plaintiff made the investment of moving her horses into the city. Id.
155. The court said that keeping horses is not a "fundamental right," and that
retroactive application presented no problem unless plaintiff had acquired a vested right.
Id. at 276, 499 S.E.2d at 116.
156. Id. at 277, 499 S.E.2d at 117. "The passage of an ordinance that applied in
general to all city residents certainly created no such 'vested right.'" Id., 499 S.E.2d at
116.
157. Id., 499 S.E.2d at 117. The court sustained the grant of summary judgment
favoring the municipality. Id. at 278, 499 S.E.2d at 117.
158. 233 Ga. App. 203, 504 S.E.2d 41 (1998).
159. Id. at 203, 504 S.E.2d at 43. Plaintiff alleged that with knowledge of a doctor's
statement that plaintiff would lose his injured finger without prompt surgery, the local
government was deliberately indifferent in providing the necessary medical care. Id., 504
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evidence," the court found no showing "that defendant's agents or
employees had with knowledge of the serious medical need of the
plaintiff to have surgery in order to avoid permanent injury; failed to
provide surgery to the plaintiff;
and such failure was the cause of
6
plaintiff's permanent injury."1 1
On occasion, claimants sought recovery from individual municipal
officers and employees,
efforts promptly met by defensive pleas of
62
"official immunity.""
In that setting, the court of appeals held in
Smith v. Little," the pivotal issue is whether the officer's acts "were
committed 'with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury.'" "
Because the trial court had employed a "wilful or wanton" standard in
assessing defendant police officer's conduct," 5 reversal was in order."
The defendant in Sommerfield v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Georgia"7 was an off-duty police officer directing traffic in a public

S.E.2d at 41.
160. "At most, the evidence in the record established the objective, deliberate
indifference through policy but not the subjective, causative act through carrying out such
policy." Id. at 207, 504 S.E.2d at 46.
161. Id. at 208, 504 S.E.2d at 47. The court thus affirmed summary judgment for the
municipality. Id.
In Franklin v. ConsolidatedGovernment of Columbus, 236 Ga. App. 468, 512 S.E.2d 352
(1999), the court rejected plaintiff's section 1983 claim for an invalid arrest and continued
imprisonment. Id. at 472, 512 S.E.2d at 356. The court determined the evidence to show
facts sufficient to warrant the police officer's belief that plaintiff had committed the robbery
in issue. Id. Thus, plaintiff "has not introduced sufficient evidence tending to show a
constitutional violation under Section 1983 in connection with his arrest." Id., 512 S.E.2d
at 357.
162. "Sovereign" or "governmental" immunity protects the local government's purse,
and "official" immunity protects officials and employees in their individual capacities so
that capable persons will fill public positions. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local
Government Officers: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of
Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort
Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
163. 234 Ga. App. 329, 506 S.E.2d 675 (1998). Plaintiff charged a municipal police
officer with negligence in failing properly to investigate an accident and in attributing fault
to the plaintiff. Id. at 329, 506 S.E.2d at 675-76.
164. Id. at 330, 506 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9). "Actual
malice in this context is 'express malice or malice in fact.'" Id. (quoting Merrow v.
Hawkins, 266 Ga. 390, 392, 467 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1996)).
165. "The trial court should have determined whether [the officer's] actions during the
traffic investigation met the actual malice standard." Id.
166. Id. "When a trial court rests its denial of summary judgment on the wrong legal
theory, such denial constitutes reversible error." Id.
167. 235 Ga. App. 375, 509 S.E.2d 100 (1998).
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roadway for a private employer."
Characterizing traffic direction as
"always a police function,"' the court approved defendant's assertion
of official immunity to a claim of negligence. 170 "We find that [the
officer] is immune from suit because he was acting in his official capacity
and performing a discretionary function. " "
The court similarly found for school district childcare workers in
Dollar v. Dalton Public Schools.1 s Rejecting a mother's claim for her
child's injury on playground equipment, 71 the court held defendants
engaged in discretionary (rather than ministerial) acts when supervising
students.7 41 5 Accordingly, the workers enjoyed the protection of official
immunity. 1
II.
A.

COUNTIES

Home Rule

Within specified limitations, the Georgia Constitution's home rule
provision empowers the county governing authority to adopt "clearly

168. Id. at 375, 509 S.E.2d at 101. Defendant testified that his superior officer
arranged for him to fill in for other officers who worked regularly for the employer. Id. at
376, 509 S.E.2d at 101.
169. Id. at 377, 509 S.E.2d at 102.
The activity of directing traffic is thus distinguished from other activities engaged
in by police officers, such as security work, for which a question may exist as to
whether an off-duty police officer is acting in his capacity as a police officer or as
a private individual on behalf of his off-duty employer while performing specific
tasks.
Id.
170. Id. Plaintiff driver charged defendant with negligently signaling plaintiff to enter
a lane of traffic only to be struck by another car. Id. at 376, 509 S.E.2d at 102.
171. Id. at 375, 509 S.E.2d at 101. The court thus affirmed a grant of summary
judgment for the defendant. Id. at 375-76, 509 S.E.2d at 101.
172. 233 Ga. App. 827, 505 S.E.2d 789 (1998).
173. The child fell from playground equipment while attending an after-school childcare
program on school district premises. Id. at 827, 505 S.E.2d at 790. The court declared such
a program "clearly a governmental activity serving an educational purpose." Id. at 828,
505 S.E.2d at 790.
174. Id. at 829, 505 S.E.2d at 791.
175. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment to
defendants. Id. at 830, 505 S.E.2d at 792. Additionally, the court rejected plaintiff's
various arguments of unconstitutionality, specifically the argument that the Georgia Tort
Claims Act (O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq.) was unconstitutional in providing only a selective
waiver of governmental immunity. Id., 505 S.E.2d at 791. For consideration of the Georgia
Tort Claims Act, its legislative and judicial treatment, and its actual operation, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Tort Claims Against the State: Georgia'sCompensationSystem, 32 GA. L. REV.
1103 (1998).
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reasonable ordinances, resolutions, or regulations relating to its
property, affairs, and local government for which no provision has been
made by general law and which is not inconsistent with this Constitution or any local law." 7 ' Specified limitations upon those delegations
county office" as well as the "form" of
include actions affecting "elective
" 177
the "governing authority.
In Krieger v. Walton County Board of Commissioners,75 the Georgia
Supreme Court held the commissioners unimpeded by the home rule
limitations when they subtracted from the powers of the board chairman.1 71 In assuming power to hire, supervise, and fire county employees, 8 ° to prepare the agenda for meetings,' and to obtain copies of
the chairman's correspondence,' 82 the commissioners had affected
neither "the office of chairperson" nor "the form of county government."'
Accordingly, "neither the constitution nor general laws
prohibits the board from assuming authority over county personnel
matters."" 4
Nevertheless, the supreme court delineated, the commissioners were
subject to local statutes as long as they did not change those statutes.'
Under existing local statutes, the chairman possessed power

176.

GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(a). Such local statutes shall remain effective until

amended or repealed by the governing authority or by voter petition. Id. For extensive
treatment of local government home rule in Georgia, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia
Home Rule System, 50 MERCER L. REV. 99 (1998).
177. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c).
178. 269 Ga. 678, 506 S.E.2d 366 (1998).
179. Id. at 680, 506 S.E.2d at 368. "This appeal involves a conflict between the Board
of Commissioners . .. and its chairperson, . . . concerning the scope of their respective
powers and duties." Id. at 678, 506 S.E.2d at 367.
180. The commissioners acted by resolution to transfer the authority to appoint and
discharge civil service employees, by a vote to transfer the supervision of department
heads, and by a contract hiring an administrative assistant to the board. Id. at 679, 506
S.E.2d at 367.
181. By resolution, the commissioners directed the county clerk to prepare the agenda
for commission meetings. Id.
182. By resolution, the commissioners directed the chairman to provide copies of his
mail to the clerk. Id. The court held this resolution not to require copies of correspondence
unrelated to county business. Id. at 684, 506 S.E.2d at 370.
183. Id. at 680, 506 S.E.2d at 368.
We have construed an "action affecting an elective office" to mean an attempt to
eliminate a chairman from the position of chief executive officer of the county and
an "action affecting the form of the county governing authority" to mean an
attempt to confer executive powers on a county manager.
Id. at 679-80, 506 S.E.2d at 367.
184. Id. at 684, 506 S.E.2d at 370.
185. Id.
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In the controverted

resolutions and votes withdrawing that power, the commissioners did not
amend the local statutes. 8 ' Accordingly, the court invalidated the
board's actions "in designating itself as an appointing authority and
immediate supervisor of county department heads." 8'
B.

Contracts

The contractual status of county handbooks and manuals confronted
the court of appeals on several occasions. In InternationalBrotherhood
of Police v. Chatham County, 8 9 plaintiffs sought the county's payment
of salary increases as specified in its personnel handbook.' 90 Affirming
summary judgment for the county, the court adumbrated Georgia's
historic "binding contracts" prohibition: "One council may not, by an

186. Id. at 682-83, 506 S.E.2d at 369. The court read the local statutes to expressly
delegate to the chairman the power to supervise county employees. Id. The court then
construed the local statutes and personnel policies together to impliedly empower the
chairman to hire and fire employees. Id.
187. Id. at 682, 506 S.E.2d at 369. The court reasoned that the commissioners might
have, but did not, amend or repeal the local statutes "by local legislation or a home rule
ordinance." Id.
188. Id.
We hold only that the local acts and county personnel policies prevent the ...
board from assuming the power to hire, supervise, and fire county employees
without amending the local acts. Therefore, we reverse the portions of the trial
court's order that upheld the board's actions in designating itself as an appointing
authority and immediate supervisor of county department heads, but affirm the
two 1997 resolutions concerning the board's agenda and chairperson's correspondence.
Id. at 684, 506 S.E.2d at 370. Chief Justice Benham dissented only on interpreting the
local statutes-the Chief Justice read those statutes as vesting power to hire and fire in
the commissioners. Id. at 685, 506 S.E.2d at 371 (Benham, C.J., dissenting).
Board of Commissionersv. Levetan, 270 Ga. 544, 512 S.E.2d 627 (1999), also featured an
intragovernmental dispute (between the board of commissioners and the county CEO) but
it turned upon the provisions of the particular county's "organizational act." Id. at 544, 512
S.E.2d at 629. The supreme court read the act to invalidate the board's ordinance
retaining a program manager to oversee and manage projects funded with specified
anticipated tax revenues. Id. at 546, 512 S.E.2d at 630. The ordinance encroached upon
the CEO's day-to-day management powers. Id. However, the court upheld the validity of
a second ordinance detailing procedures to be followed in appropriating the revenues. Id.
at 547, 512 S.E.2d at 631. Those procedures found authorization in the organization act.
Id.
189. 232 Ga. App. 507, 502 S.E.2d 341 (1998).
190. Id. at 507, 502 S.E.2d at 341. The county handbook provided "that county
employees who perform to certain standards will receive specified salary increases." Id.
The commissioners had funded the increases in earlier years, but not recently. Id. The
court assumed that the county was bound to follow the provisions and that the handbook
did not condition the increases on funding approval. Id. at 508, 502 S.E.2d at 341.
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ordinance, bind itself or its successors so as to prevent free legislation in
matters of municipal government." 9' Characterizing the "appropriating process" as a "legislative function," 192 the court held the commissioners "free each year to fund or not to fund salary increases for the
employees." 93
A similar controversy received similar treatment in Johnson v. Fulton
County,"9 an employees' action founded upon a county handbook's
provision of four percent annual pay raises.'95 First, the court held
that this provision, when read with discretionary personnel regulations, 19' afforded county employees no contractual right.'9 7 Even
assuming otherwise, the court continued, "the handbook ... cannot

prevent free legislation by binding future county authorities to approve
annual salary increases. "

9'

Ellison v. DeKalb County' 99 featured a conflict between provisions
of a settlement agreement and the county employee manual in respect
to qualifications for police promotions. 200 Holding the manual devoid

191. Id. at 508-09, 502 S.E.2d at 342 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3(a) (1993)). For
background and perspective on the precept, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government and
Contracts That Bind, 3 GA. L. REV. 546 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in
Georgia Local Government Law: Recent Perspectives, 11 GA. ST. B.J. 148 (1975); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in Georgia Local Government Law: Configurations of
Codification, 24 GA. L. REV. 95 (1989); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in County
Government-Never Mind, GA. COUNTY GOV'T MAG. 28 (Mar. 1991).
192. 232 Ga. App. at 509, 502 S.E.2d at 342 (quoting Wilson v. Southerland, 258 Ga.
479, 480, 371 S.E.2d 382, 383 (1988)).
193. Id. "Any contrary language in the handbook could not legally bind the board to
approve or fund increases in the future." Id.
194. 235 Ga. App. 277, 509 S.E.2d 355 (1998).
195. Id. at 277, 509 S.E.2d at 356. The handbook provided as follows: "'A multi-step
salary range is established for each class and position. These steps or increments provide
for regular annual increases of one step (4%) each year.'" Id. Plaintiffs alleged county
failure to pay the increases for the past several years. Id.
196. The court noted that the handbook referred the employee to personnel regulations
and those regulations only "provide for the possibility of such increases at the discretion
of county authorities." Id. at 279, 509 S.E.2d at 357.
197. Id. "[Tihe employees' claim that the county had a contractual obligation to give
annual raises is without basis in fact or law." Id.
198. Id., 509 S.E.2d at 358 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3(a)). The court also rejected
plaintiffs' position that the county was estopped from denying the salary raises. Id. at 280,
509 S.E.2d at 358. For treatment of the doctrine of estoppel as it operates in Georgia local
government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1985).

199. 236 Ga. App. 185, 511 S.E.2d 284 (1999).
200. Id. at 185, 511 S.E.2d at 284. The county had entered into the settlement
agreement with law enforcement officers in 1987, and the agreement was modified in 1996
so as to require three years in rank before consideration for promotion. The amendment,
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of contractual status, the court emphasized the manual's own express
indication that "the selection process will be governed by the settlement
agreement.""' Because plaintiff's promotion claim was "predicated
manual,"" 2 the court affirmed summary
solely upon the employee
20 3

judgment to the county.

Finally, the issue of Faulk v. Twviggs County0 4 went to yet another
historic county contract requirement: the agreement "shall be in writing
and entered on [the governing authority's] minutes."0 5 In Faulk the
county retained plaintiff's services, at a specified unit-price rate per
yard, "for those non-priority paving projects for which funding might be
obtained in the future.""' The county entered its acceptance of
plaintiff's bid on the minutes and, after verification of work periodically
done, entered on the minutes the amount payable for the job.20 7
Although no separate written contract was negotiated (and entered) for
each individual paving project,0 ' the supreme court rejected an attack
upon the procedure.0 9 "Such a contract for the performance of an
indefinite amount of services is sufficient where the key for the
determination of the sum to be paid or the service to be rendered is
contained within the contract." 10

however, was not placed in the county employee manual which continued to state the prior
requirement of only two years in rank. Id., 511 S.E.2d at 284-85. Plaintiff "contends that
the employee manual amounted to a binding contract and gave him the right to be
considered for promotion after only two years experience as a sergeant." Id. at 186, 511
S.E.2d at 285.
201. Id. at 187, 511 S.E.2d at 286. The manual only set forth policies and information
concerning employment, the court reasoned, and was not to be viewed as a contract Id.
202. Id. "To the extent that any document gave plaintiff a contractual right to be
considered for promotion, it was the settlement agreement, and not the employee manual."
203. Id.
204. 269 Ga. 809, 504 S.E.2d 668 (1998).
205. O.C.G.A. § 36-10-1 (1993). For treatment of this statute, its history and its
evolution by the Georgia courts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., County Contracts in Georgia:
"Written and Entered," 32 MERCER L. REV. 283 (1980).
206. 269 Ga. at 810, 504 S.E.2d at 669. The case arose when plaintiff paver sued the
county for payment for a job and county taxpayers intervened as defendants contending
that the contract was ultra vires. They sought an interlocutory injunction against the
settlement of the case by plaintiff and the county. Id. at 809-10, 504 S.E.2d at 669.
207. Id.
208. The court said "there was only one contract between the County and [plaintiff),
encompassing all of the separate off-priority paving projects which the County requested
that [plaintiff] perform." Id. at 810, 504 S.E.2d at 669-70.
209. Id. at 811, 502 S.E.2d at 670. "When the paving project contemplated by the
County's promise of payment was completed by [plaintiff], that promise became valid and
binding on the County." Id.
210. Id. "Because the evidence did not demand a finding that the contract was ultra
vires, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, was authorized to deny the temporary
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C. Legislation
The interface between general and local statutes constitutes an issue
of vast historical complexity in Georgia local government law.21'
Context for the issue found apt illustration in the facts of Randolph
County v. Bantz,212 a controversy over a county magistrate's right to
additional compensation for also serving as clerk of the magistrate
court.2 13 Although a general statute expressly required compensation,214 that statute also deferred to any local statute providing for a
clerk. 215 Because a local statute authorized the county to select and
pay a clerk216 and the county had failed to do so, the county contended
there was no salaried clerk to compensate.2 17 Rejecting the county's
"literal" position as "neither equitable nor just,"218 a unanimous
supreme court approved plaintiff's prayer for mandamus.219 Under the
general statute, the county could not, "simply by withholding the
exercise of its discretionary authority under the local act,. . . obtain the
benefit of [plaintiff's] additional service as clerk . . ., but incur no
obligation to pay her any additional compensation."220
The period's far more noteworthy "legislation" issue arose in Franklin
County v. Fieldale Farms Corp.:221 the test for invalidating local

injunction against the County's settlement of [plaintiffs] claim." Id.
211. For treatment of the issue, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., When is a Special Law
Unlawfully Special?, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1167 (1976); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Unlawful
Special Laws: A Postscript on the Proscription,30 MERCER L. REV. 319 (1978). These
articles are reprinted in R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA STATUTORY LAW 71,
91 (1997).
212. 270 Ga. 66, 508 S.E.2d 169 (1998).
213. Plaintiff was chief magistrate of the county magistrate court. Id. at 66, 508 S.E.2d
at 170.
214. O.C.G.A. § 15-10-105(d) (1999).
215. Id. § 15-10-105(a).
216. 1984 Ga. Laws 3638.
217. 270 Ga. at 67, 508 S.E.2d at 170. The court reasoned that "[i]t is this failure of
[the county] to exercise the discretionary authority granted under the local act which
compels [plaintiffs] performance of the additional duties of clerk of the court." Id.
218. Id., 508 S.E.2d at 170-71.
219. Id. at 68, 508 S.E.2d at 171. Plaintiff"was entitled to additional compensation for
serving as clerk and the trial court did not err in issuing the writ of mandamus." Id. For
in depth discussion of the proliferating role of mandamus in Georgia local government law,
see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw
(1989).
220. Id. at 67, 508 S.E.2d at 171. "No county can benefit from a clerk's performance
of administrative duties on behalf of the magistrate court without being responsible for
compensating the individual who performs those duties." Id. at 68, 508 S.E.2d at 171.
221. 270 Ga. 272, 507 S.E.2d 460 (1998).
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statutes (or ordinances) because of existing general statutes. The
necessity for such a test arises from the traditional constitutional
admonition: "[N]o local or special law shall be enacted in any case for
which provision has been made by an existing general law."222 Over
many years, Georgia's appellate courts employed an assortment of
formulae for deciding when this provision invalidated local measures.2 11 In 1978 the supreme court finally conceded its prior decisions
to be "irreconcilable" and announced as its future test "whether there is
a genuine conflict between the special and general law."224
The Constitution of 1983 perpetuated the traditional prohibition but
with an additional phrase: "[N]o local or special law shall be enacted in
any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law,
except that the General Assembly may by general law authorize local
governments by local ordinance or resolution to exercise police powers
which do not conflict with general laws." 25 Did this226 italicized exception augur for a change in judicial approach as well?

In Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp.,2 7 plaintiff sued the
county for acting under its land disposal ordinance to deny plaintiff's
application to apply sludge on specified farm land.2 8 Plaintiff possessed EPA approval for the operation under a general statute regulating sludge application and permitting local governments to assess

222.

223.

GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 4 (1976).
See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., When Is A Special Law Unlawfully Special?, 27 MERCER

L. REV. 1167 (1976), reprintedin R. PERRY

SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA STATUTORY

LAW 71 (1997).

224. City of Atlanta v. Associated Builders & Contractors Inc., 240 Ga. 655, 656-57,
242 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1978). For treatment of this case in historical context, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Unlawful Special Laws: A Postscripton the Proscription,30 MERCER L. REV.
319 (1978), reprintedin R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA STATUTORY LAW 91
(1997).
225. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 4 (1983).
226. For caution of such a potential, some fifteen years before its confirmation by the
Georgia Supreme Court, and assuredly not referred to by the Court, see Local Government
Law and the Constitution of 1983: Selected Shorts, R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., ADDITIONAL
STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 565, 578-82 (1983).
227. 270 Ga. 272, 507 S.E.2d 460 (1998).

228. Plaintiff proposed removing the sludge from the wastewater in its chicken
rendering plant and applying it to sixty-two acres of agricultural land in the county. After
obtaining a state permit, plaintiff applied to the county for the one-time application of the
sludge to the land. Upon the county's denial of its application, under the county land
disposal ordinance, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, injunction, and mandamus.
Id. at 273, 507 S.E.2d at 461.
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reasonable monitoring fees.229 Plaintiff maintained that the general
statute's existence invalidated the county's land disposal ordinance.23 °
The supreme court first reviewed the 1983 Constitution's change in
the local statute prohibition. 23 ' The original prohibition, the court
reasoned, now precludes local statutes and ordinances which are
"preempted" by general statutes.2" 2 Moreover, the "preemption may be
express or implied."3 3 Under that approach, the general statute in
FieldaleFarmsclearly preempted the county land disposal ordinance, an
ordinance seeking "to establish a duplicate permit system."2 3 4 As for
the constitution's "new" addition, the court viewed it to provide an
"exception to the general rule of preemption when general law authorizes
the local government to act and the local ordinance does not conflict with
general law."2 35 This exception could not save the county ordinance
because the general statute authorized only county monitoring fees, not
substantive regulations. 236 Accordingly, the court declared the county
237
ordinance invalid and affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff.

229. O.C.G.A. § 12-5-30.3 (1996).
230. 270 Ga. at 273, 507 S.E.2d at 461. "The trial court granted [plaintiff] summary
judgment on several grounds, including that state law preempted the county from enacting
any ordinance dealing with water quality control." Id.
231. The court stated:
To resolve the confusion in our case law, the drafters of the 1983 Constitution
revised the uniformity clause .... [T]he committee recommended adopting an
exception to the general rule of preemption to permit local governments to have
concurrent jurisdiction with the state to exercise certain police powers in areas of
concern to both. The Legislative Oversight Committee adopted the exception, and
voters ratified it.
Id. at 274-75, 507 S.E.2d at 462. For discussion of the Georgia courts' use of legislative
history in construing both statutes and provisions of the constitution, see R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Georgia Statutory Construction: The Use of Legislative History, 33 GA. ST. B.J. 30
(1996), reprinted in R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA STATUTORY LAw 169
(1997).
232. 270 Ga. at 275, 507 S.E.2d at 462-63. "The clause's first provision follows the
preemption rule of previous constitutions by precluding local or special laws when general
laws exist on the same subject." Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 278, 507 S.E.2d at 464. "By this ordinance, the county has enacted a local
ordinance dealing with the same subject as general law. As a result, the general
preemption rule controls unless the county ordinance falls within the exception to the
uniformity clause." Id. at 276, 507 S.E.2d at 463.
235. Id. at 275, 507 S.E.2d at 463.
236. Id. at 278, 507 S.E.2d at 464. "Based on the language and legislative history of
the state statute, we conclude that the General Assembly has failed to authorize local
governments to regulate the application of sludge to land except in the specific area of
monitoring." Id.
237. Id.
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In reverting from its 1978 "genuine conflict" test to a test of "express
or implied preemption," the supreme court has expanded the scope for
invalidating local statutes, as well as the ordinances and resolutions of
local governments. Only the future will reveal the extent to which the
court will employ its self-construed tactic.
D.

Power

The issue of county power emerged from an effort to assimilate
authority with obligation. Smith v. Pulaski County23 8 featured plaintiff's action to mandamus county preservation of an abandoned
cemetery.239 Because the material general statute only authorizes
counties to care for abandoned cemeteries and burial grounds,2 40 the
supreme court held there is "no mandatory duty on the part of [the
county] to take any affirmative action to protect [plaintiff's] family
cemetery."241
Accordingly, the court sustained the trial judge's
dismissal of plaintiff's action.242
E.

Regulation

County regulation gone awry led to Gantt v.Bennett,243 an action for
fraud in the county health inspector's issuance of plaintiffs' septic system

permit. 244 Holding the evidence sufficient for submission to the jury,
the court of appeals emphasized the inspector's admission that he
breached county regulations in issuing the permit without a visual

238. 269 Ga. 688, 501 S.E.2d 213 (1998).
239. Id. at 688, 501 S.E.2d at 214.
240. O.C.G.A. § 36-72-3 (1993). "Counties ...are authorized ...to preserve and
protect any abandoned cemetery or any burial ground which the county ...determines has
been abandoned or is not being maintained by the person who is legally responsible for its
upkeep." Id.
241. 269 Ga. at 689, 501 S.E.2d at 214.
242. Id. "In view of the clearly permissive language of the statute, we agree with the
trial court that O.C.G.A. § 36-72-3 authorizes but does not compel a county to preserve and
protect abandoned cemeteries." Id. For a perspective on the large number of unsuccessful
efforts to mandamus local government actions, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING
MANDAMUS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1989).

243. 231 Ga. App. 238, 499 S.E.2d 75 (1998). For background on the issue of county
regulation generally, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretionin GeorgiaLocal GovernmentLaw,
8 GA. L. REV. 614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit
in Georgia Local Government Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 115 (1974).
244. Plaintiff home buyers sued the seller, the county, and its health inspector, for a
malfunctioning septic system. The jury found for plaintiffs in fraud, and defendants
appealed on grounds that the evidence did not support the fraud verdict. 231 Ga. App. at
240, 499 S.E.2d at 78.
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inspection.24 5 Indeed, his supervisor testified that the inspector was
reprimanded for "falsification of documents."246
A permissible instance of regulation unfolded.in Smith v.Gwinnett
County,24 an appeal from a trial court's receivership appointment for
the owners' property. Reviewing the scenario, the supreme court found
that when the owners began developing their property without requisite
county permits, the trial judge issued an injunction, subsequently took
control of the property, and ordered the county to restore it with costs
assessed to owners.24 Upon the owners' failure to pay those costs, the
court concluded, the judge's levy on the property validly satisfied the
county's personal judgment against them.249
Chu v. Augusta-Richmond County20 featured an unsuccessful appeal
from county denial of a license for the off-premises retail sale of beer and
wine.211 Preliminarily, the court reviewed general statutes vesting
local governments with discretionary powers over sales of alcoholic
beverages, but requiring "ascertainable standards" for licensing
ordinances.252 Proceeding to an examination of the county's ordinances,25 the court found "sufficient objective standards" regarding schools,
churches, traffic, neighborhoods, congregation of minors, and number of
other licenses granted.21 4 The commissioners relied on those "specific,

245. Id. at 243, 499 S.E.2d at 80. Despite a county requirement that final inspection
be made before written approval was issued, the inspector "admitted that he issued the
permit for [plaintiffs'] property without performing a visual inspection. He stated that he
issued the permit and inspection report based on the contractor's drawing." Id.
246. Id., 499 S.E.2d at 81. In a dissenting opinion, two judges maintained the evidence
to show that the inspector had not intended to mislead anyone in approving the system
pursuant to the contractor's drawing and that, given the absence of evidence of intent to
mislead, there could be no cause of action in fraud. Id. at 247, 499 S.E.2d at 83
(Blackburn, J., dissenting).
247. 270 Ga. 424, 510 S.E.2d 525 (1999).
248. Id. at 424-25, 510 S.E.2d at 526. The court had rejected the owners' appeal from
these actions in Smith v. Gwinnett County, 268 Ga. 179, 486 S.E.2d 151 (1997). 270 Ga.
at 424-25, 510 S.E.2d at 526.
249. 270 Ga. at 425, 510 S.E.2d at 526. "Thus, the County did not take the property
in violation of the constitutional requirement of payment of just and adequate compensation. The court ordered a levy on the property in order to satisfy a valid personal judgment
which the County obtained against the [owners]." Id.
250. 269 Ga. 822, 504 S.E.2d 693 (1998).
251. Id. at 822, 504 S.E.2d at 694. For background on the issue of county regulation
in respect to alcoholic beverages, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and
Liquor Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REv. 1039 (1981).
252. 269 Ga. at 823, 504 S.E.2d at 695.
253. O.C.G.A. § 3-3-2 (1990).
254. 269 Ga. at 825, 504 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting Augusta-Richmond County Code § 6-264 & 65). The court distinguished Arras v. Herrin, 255 Ga. 11, 334 S.E.2d 677 (1985). 269

426

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

ascertainable criteria" and "articulated those standards on the minutes
of the meetings" at which they denied the application.25 5
Governmental discretion also controlled Gwinnett County v. Ehler
Enterprises, Inc.,256 a challenged denial of a special use permit for a
tire store and service center. Emphasizing its limited role of "any
evidence" review, 257 the supreme court examined county guidelines for
259
permits25 s as well as the county's articulated reasons for denial.
Rejecting plaintiff's petition for mandamus, the court found the record
to show that "each of [the county's] reasons is supported by evidence
presented to the board."2"
F

Property
County roads carried at least two cases to the supreme court. In
Chandler v. Robinson,26 ' the court held that an owner's occasional
request for county work on a private road did not implicitly dedicate the
road for public use.262 Implied dedication likewise did not result from

Ga. at 825, 504 S.E.2d at 696.
255. 269 Ga. at 825, 504 S.E.2d at 696. "We hold that the... ordinance provides an
applicant with adequate notice of the criteria that will be applied in consideration of an
application for an alcohol license, and that the Commission in this case exercised its
discretion within those plain, ascertainable standards." Id. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
"AscertainableStandards"vs "UnbridledDiscretion"in GeorgiaLocal Government Law, GA.
COuNTY GOVT MAG. 19 (Dec. 1989).
256. 270 Ga. 570, 512 S.E.2d 239 (1999).
257. Id. at 570, 512 S.E.2d at 241.
In the appellate court, the standard of review is whether any evidence supports
the board's decision, not whether any evidence supports the trial court's decision.
This is an important distinction. By focusing on whether the board's decision is
supported by any evidence, we recognize that zoning is a legislative and not
judicial function.
Id.
258. Id. at 571, 512 S.E.2d at 241. The guidelines called for consideration of the
immediate neighborhood and that "the board is to consider the policies and objectives of
[the county's] Comprehensive Plan, the effect on traffic, storm drainage, and land values."
Id.
259. Id. The county board articulated twelve reasons for its denial including the
neighborhood, noise, odors, and visual blight. Id.
260. Id. The court thus reversed the trial judge's grant of a mandamus. Id. For
emphasis upon the unsuccessful use of mandamus in Georgia local government law, see R.
PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN LOCAL GovERNMENT LAW (1989).
261. 269 Ga. 881, 506 S.E.2d 121 (1998). The case featured an effort by plaintiffs to
use a private road providing access between their property and a county road. Defendant
owners of the private road denied plaintiffs its use. Id. at 881, 506 S.E.2d at 122.
262. Id. at 882-83, 506 S.E.2d at 123. "It is established that by permitting public
authorities to occasionally scrape and grade a private road, a property owner does not
manifest an intention to dedicate the roadway." Id.
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a DOT road map's depiction of the road.263 Finally, plaintiffs' prescriptive acquisition argument failed because of no "continuous use of [the
private road] by anyone for the requisite seven years. " "
Ketchum v. Whitfield County... presented the reverse scenario:
property owners sought to prevent the opening of a public road.266
First, the court held that a deed by plaintiffs' grantors, although "not a
perfect legal description," contained "numerous keys to the intended
location of [the road]." 6 7 That deed expressly dedicated the property
to the county, which the county accepted by maintaining a part of the
existing roadway.2" Although plaintiffs had used the remaining part
of the property for their own purposes, "prescription does not run against
the State or one of its subdivisions."269
The county's freedom from prescription also controlled Williams v.
Fayette County,270 an action to enjoin county construction of a water
tower on land claimed by the plaintiff. 271 In response, the court
deemed conclusive an undisputed 1894 grant of county title.272 "In
view of the doctrine that adverse possession does not run against a

263. Id. at 883, 506 S.E.2d at 123. The court said that a road's placement on an official
highway map is an "administrative" act and does not "'fix the status of the public right of
use of every road in Georgia.'" Id. (quoting Jordan v. Way, 235 Ga. 496, 498, 220 S.E.2d
258, 261 (1975)).
264. Id. at 884,506 S.E.2d at 124. The court relied upon evidence that the private road
"was both blocked and impassable for approximately ten years prior to the [defendants']
acquisition of their property and clearance of the roadway." Id. at 883-84, 506 S.E.2d at
124. Accordingly, the court affirmed a summary judgment for defendants. Id. at 884, 506
S.E.2d at 124.
265. 270 Ga. 180, 508 S.E.2d 639 (1998).
266. Id. at 180, 508 S.E.2d at 639. The roadway which the county proposed to open
divided plaintiffs' properties. Plaintiffs contended they held prescriptive title to the
property; the county responded with a plea of express dedication. Id., 508 S.E.2d at 640.
267. Id. at 181-82, 508 S.E.2d at 641. The court noted the contents of the deed, its
description and starting points, as well as extrinsic evidence supporting the description.
Id.
268. Id. at 182, 508 S.E.2d at 641. The court noted that "in the case of an express,
rather than an implied, dedication by the landowner, 'it is not necessary that the public
authorities should work the entire street within the confines of the grant, to make effectual
the act of acceptance.'" Id. (quoting Hobbs v. Ware County, 247 Ga. 385, 386, 276 S.E.2d
575, 576 (1981)).
269. Id. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial judge's denial of plaintiffs' petition
for an injunction. Id.
270. 270 Ga. 528, 510 S.E.2d 825 (1999).
271. Id. at 528, 510 S.E.2d at 825. Plaintiff charged the county with trespass. Id. at
528-29, 510 S.E.2d at 825.
272. Id. "As it is undisputed that the 1894 deed served to place fee simple title to the
property in [the county] and the County cannot therefore be liable for trespass upon
property which it owns, we affirm [summary judgment to county]." Id.
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county, . . the trial court was correct in its ruling that the property
deeded to [the county] in 1894 was not subject to [plaintiff's] claim of
ownership by... prescription."273

G. Liability
County liability litigation showed little signs of slowing.2 74 Success
in such litigation generally assumes plaintiff's compliance with the ante
litem notice statute: "All claims against counties must be presented
within twelve months after they accrue or become payable or the same
275
are barred."
The court of appeals applied that statute in Board of
Regents v. Putnam County27 against a hospital's effort to recover from
the county for medical services provided to a county inmate.277

Rejecting plaintiff's position that its claim did not arise from contract
(but was fixed by law and thus within an exception to the notice

mandate), the court held that neither the right to payment nor its
amount was "fixed by law."271

Moreover, the statute's twelve-month

273. Id. at 529, 510 S.E.2d at 826. The court also rejected plaintiff's request for
reformation of the 1894 deed and likewise the argument "that the County somehow
divested itself of title to the property when the ... Board of Commissioners passed a
resolution to condemn the property which the County already owned." Id.
274. For general perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government Tort
Liability: The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. (1985); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
275. O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 (1993). For background on the county notice requirement, see
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Claims Against Counties: The Difference A Year Makes, 36 MERCER
L. REV. 1 (1984).
276. 234 Ga. App. 427, 506 S.E.2d 923 (1998).
277. Id. at 428, 506 S.E.2d at 924. The inmate was injured in a fight at the prison and
was not discharged from the hospital until several months later. Id.
278. Id. at 428-29, 506 S.E.2d at 924. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 provides that the county must
furnish its prisoners "any needed medical and hospital attention." Plaintiff relied upon
Terrell County v. Albany /Dougherty Hospital Authority, 256 Ga. 627, 352 S.E.2d 378
(1987), holding that ante litem notice applied to claims arising from contract and not to a
claim when the right to and amount of the claim are fixed by law. 234 Ga. App. at 428,
506 S.E.2d at 924 (citing 256 Ga. at 630, 352 S.E.2d at 381). The court distinguished
Terrell: "While the law does provide that the prisoner has a right to any needed hospital
attention, there is no law providing that the county must pay the hospital, as was the case
in Terrell." Id. at 428, 506 S.E.2d at 924.
The court reached a similar conclusion in Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority v.
Reece, 236 Ga. App. 669, 513 S.E.2d 243 (1999), sustaining a jury decision favoring a
county and its sheriff against a hospital's attempt to collect for services provided county
detainees. Id. at 669-70, 513 S.E.2d at 244. The court affirmed the trial judge's refusal
to charge that the detainees were under county arrest when the services were provided.
Id. at 672, 513 S.E.2d at 246.
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period began running on the day the hospital released the inmate rather
than following the thirty days allowed for payment of hospital bills." 9
Primary ploys at avoiding county tort immunity sounded in inverse
condemnation and constitutional tort. The inverse condemnation
venture succeeded in Columbia County v. Doolittle,28 ° an action for
surface water damage to plaintiff's pond from county drainage systems
in upstream subdivisions. 281 Reviewing the record, the supreme court
found "substantial evidence" of the county's responsibility 2 and its
allowing excessive sedimentation onto plaintiff's land.2"
The constitutional tort assertion, an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,254 surfaced in several contexts. Plaintiff prison inmate in
Cantrell v. Thurman2' employed the statute against county officers for
inadequate medical attention. 28" Emphasizing plaintiff's thirteen visits
to the jail's independent contractor physician, however, the court of
appeals concluded that "any deprivation was caused by someone for

279. 234 Ga. App. at 429, 506 S.E.2d at 925. "The trial court did not err in dismissing
[plaintiffs] claim for failure to comply with the ante litem notice requirement of O.C.G.A.
§ 36-11-1." Id.
The supreme court was equally adamant in Dolinger v. Driver, 269 Ga. 141, 498 S.E.2d
252 (1998): "The issue for decision ... is whether high school students who lack the
required course credits to graduate can resort to a court of equity and obtain an injunction
that would allow the students to march in a graduation ceremony. The answer is 'no.'"
Id. at 141, 498 S.E.2d at 253.
280. 270 Ga. 490, 512 S.E.2d 236 (1999).
281. Id. at 491, 512 S.E.2d at 237. "We have interpreted [the constitution's eminent
domain] provision as waiving sovereign immunity in an inverse condemnation action and
permitting the county to be sued for damages and enjoined for creating or maintaining a
continuing nuisance." Id.
282. Id. at 492, 512 S.E.2d at 238. Plaintiff "presented evidence that the county had
accepted control of the streets, sanitary sewage systems, and storm drainage systems in
four subdivisions built upstream and was responsible for maintaining the systems." Id.
283. Id. Plaintiff's "expert witnesses, including civil engineers and a real estate
appraiser, testified that the county was using the pond as a sediment retention pond for
a public purpose." Id. The court thus upheld both damage awards and injunctive relief
against the county. Id. at 494, 512 S.E.2d at 239.
284. This federal statute imposes civil liability on "persons" acting under color of state
law or custom who deprive others of a constitutional or statutory right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994). For background on and analysis of the "constitutional tort," see R. PERRY SENTELL,
JR., GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW'S ASSIMILATION OF MONELL: SECTION 1983 AND

THE NEW "PERSONS" (1984); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government and Constitutional
Torts: In the Georgia Courts, 49 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1997).
285. 231 Ga. App. 510, 499 S.E.2d 416 (1998).
286. Id. at 511, 499 S.E.2d at 419. Plaintiff injured his foot while in jail, saw the jail's
physician on thirteen occasions, and eventually suffered permanent disability. Id. at 51011, 499 S.E.2d at 418-19.
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whom the defendants were not responsible."287 Plaintiff fared no
2 s. a basketbetter in Darnell v. Houston County Board of Education,
ball referee's action for alleged abuses by school officials.2" 9 Affirming
summary judgment for defendants,29 the court found no "nexus
between a policy of the Board and the alleged violation of [plaintiff's]
federally protected rights."29 ' Indeed, plaintiff "offered no evidence
that the Board intentionally or deliberately promulgated or tolerated any
impermissible policy."292
Increasingly, plaintiffs also direct their claims against county officers
and employees.29 Those suits typically evoke the response of "official
immunity," an immunity turning upon whether the offending conduct is
"ministerial" (liability for negligence) or "discretionary" (liability for
willfulness).2 94
Declaring operation of a police department "discretionary," the court
of appeals awarded official immunity to the county sheriff in Lowe v.
Jones County.295 There, a third party struck and killed the decedent
who was being arrested by a deputy.2 Rejecting the claim of wrongful

287.

Id. at 513, 499 S.E.2d at 420. "Plaintifffailed to show a causal connection between

the deprivation of his constitutional rights and his untreated infection, because the
defendants provided and arranged repeated medical attention over 13 times through [the
physician]. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants."
Id. Similarly, Epps v. Gwinnett County, 231 Ga. App. 664, 499 S.E.2d 657 (1998), featured
a wrongful death claim against the county and its sheriff for an inmate's inadequate
medical care. Id. at 664-65, 499 S.E.2d at 659. In affirming summary judgment for
defendants, the court reasoned that "the fact that [the county] contracted with PHS [Prison
Health Service] to provide medical care at the detention center, and that it relied on PHS
to provide such care, does not amount to an intentionally corrupt or impermissible policy
which would violate any citizen's Eighth Amendment rights." Id. at 669,499 S.E.2d at 662.
288. 234 Ga. App. 488, 506 S.E.2d 385 (1998).
289. Id. at 489, 506 S.E.2d at 387. Plaintiff alleged both emotional and physical abuses
when school officials became dissatisfied with his officiating of a middle school basketball
game. Id.
290. "Nor could [plaintiff] prevail against the Board on his claims asserted under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivation of federal rights under color of state law." Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for Their
Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia
Local Government Law: The HauntingHiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 405 (1993).
294.

GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(d).

295. 231 Ga. App. 372, 373, 499 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1998).
296. Id. at 372, 499 S.E.2d at 350. "As the two officers had [decedent] on the pavement
in a traffic lane and were attempting to handcuff him, a car struck all three." Id.
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death, the court saw "no showing of any conduct by [the sheriff] ...
which would amount to wilfulness, malice or corruption."29 7
The court reached the same conclusion in Parrishv.Akins 298 regarding a county correctional officer sued by the victim of an escaped
prisoner.29
It was "clear," the court reasoned, "that an officer
supervising inmates on a work detail has many responsibilities beyond
simply watching inmates."3° ° Defendant's decision as to where prisoners would work "was fully within his judgment"3 ' and "discretionary;"~302 any error constituted "at most" only negligence. 303
Stone v. Taylor"4 featured a motorist's action against a county
commission chairman who failed to level the shoulders of a resurfaced

road. 3 5 The court held that when defendant examined the road and
decided against leveling the shoulders, he exercised
a discretionary
306
function and was entitled to official immunity.

297. Id. at 373, 499 S.E.2d at 350. "Liability may be imposed as a result of the exercise
of such a discretionary function only when the acts complained of are done within the scope
of the officer's authority and with wilfulness, malice or corruption." Id.
298. 233 Ga. App. 442, 504 S.E.2d 276 (1998).
299. Id. at 422, 504 S.E.2d at 277. While supervising six inmates working at the
courthouse annex, defendant allowed four of the inmates to work out of his view for some
fifty minutes while he worked with two inmates on the other side of the building. Two of
the inmates beyond defendant's view escaped and later attacked plaintiff and stole her car.
Id.
300. Id. at 443-44, 504 S.E.2d at 278. "Contrary to [plaintiffs] claim, the mere fact that
supervising the prisoners is a mandatory function does not render the actual carrying out
of the supervision a ministerial function unprotected by official immunity." Id. at 443, 504
S.E.2d at 278.
301. Id. at 444, 504 S.E.2d at 278.
302. Id., 504 S.E.2d at 279. "[W]e find that the task given to [defendant] to supervise
inmates working outside [the prison] was a discretionary, as opposed to a ministerial,
function." Id.
303. Id. "Because [defendant's] supervision of inmates working outside the prison was
a discretionary duty executed without malice, the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment to him on the basis of his official immunity." Id. at 444-45, 504 S.E.2d at 279.
304. 233 Ga. App. 886, 506 S.E.2d 161 (1998).
305. Id. at 887, 506 S.E.2d at 162-63. The county had contracted with the DOT to
resurface the road, and the contract called for the county to later level the shoulders of the
road "when applicable." Id., 506 S.E.2d at 163. Plaintiff was later injured when her car
veered off the road, allegedly as a result of a steep drop-off which prevented her from
steering back onto the road. Id.
306. Id. at 889, 506 S.E.2d at 164. "[The chairman's] act in this case when he inspected
the shoulders of County Road 280 and decided not to modify them or post warning signs
was ... discretionary." Id. As for the county's obligation under the contract with DOT,
"[tihe words 'when applicable' allowed [the chairman] the discretion to decide whether
leveling the shoulders was warranted under the circumstances." Id. at 890, 506 S.E.2d at
164. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's award of summary judgment to defendant.
Id., 506 S.E.2d at 165.
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The supreme court administered the test in Harry v. Glynn County..7 to a county paramedic who unsuccessfully attended plaintiff's
stricken wife.30 8 On grounds that defendant's emergency duties "were
clearly discretionary,"0 9 and that plaintiff alleged neither "malice
[nor]
31
0
intent to injure," 31 the paramedic enjoyed official immunity. '

County school operations supplied context in several settings. Payne
v. Twiggs County School District 312 presented claims against an
assistant principal and school bus driver for injuries inflicted by one
student upon another while on the bus.313 On grounds that "disciplinary and supervisory tasks of school officials" were consistently classified
as discretionary functions, 14 the court of appeals affirmed defendants'
protection by official immunity.3 15 The court reached the same conclusions in Daniels v. Gordon,316 involving a teacher who "grasped [a
student's] face to get his attention" in the classroom; 17 and in Caldwell v. Griffin Spalding County Board of Education,"' involving
hazing injuries to a student at football camp.31 9

307. 269 Ga. 503, 501 S.E.2d 196 (1998).
308. Id. at 503, 501 S.E.2d at 198. Plaintiff's wife collapsed in a restaurant where
defendant treated her and transported her to the hospital. Id.
309. Id. at 505, 501 S.E.2d at 199. Those duties were "first to ascertain the condition
of the patient, [and] then to provide the treatment appropriate to that condition while
transporting the patient to the hospital." Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment to the
defendant. Id. at 506, 501 S.E.2d at 200.
312. 232 Ga. App. 175, 501 S.E.2d 550 (1998).
313. Id. at 175-76, 501 S.E.2d at 551. Plaintiff alleged that defendants knew that the
student had previously threatened plaintiff with a knife "but negligently failed to carry out
the 'ministerial' act of enforcing the school's weapons policy." Id. at 177, 501 S.E.2d at 552.
314. Id. at 178, 501 S.E.2d at 552. The court reasoned that the school's weapons policy
required the defendants to assess the credibility of the previous report and "make a
judgment call as to whether those allegations merited immediate investigation of [the
student]." Id. These facts, the court said, "demonstrate the discretionary nature of the
school officials' disciplinary duties." Id.
315. Id., 501 S.E.2d at 553. The court affirmed summary judgment for defendants. Id.
316. 232 Ga. App. 811, 503 S.E.2d 72 (1998).
317. Id. at 813, 503 S.E.2d at 75. First, the court held the teacher's conduct not to
amount to corporal punishment; second, the teacher "was simply fulfilling her discretionary
tasks of monitoring, supervising and controlling the students in her class when she grasped
[plaintiffs] face to get his attention," and "there [was] no evidence whatsoever of actual
malice." Id. The court affirmed summary judgements for the teacher and the school
principal. Id.
318. 232 Ga. App. 892, 503 S.E.2d 43 (1998).
319. Id. at 892, 503 S.E.2d at 43-44. Again, the court held supervision of student safety
to be a discretionary function. Id. at 894, 503 S.E.2d at 44. Here,
[e]ven assuming that the beating in this case amounted to criminal hazing, it is
undisputed that this activity was unknown to [the school principal and football
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Plaintiffs enjoyed more success in actions against county officers for
allegedly defective roads. In Ross v. Taylor County,32 the court of
appeals distinguished between "a decision to build a road" and "the
actual work of constructing it."321 It was clear from the defendant road
superintendent's testimony "that his work consisted solely of ministerial
acts." 22 Reversing summary judgment for defendant,3 23 therefore,
the court reiterated that "'the duties of a road supervisor in carrying out
the physical details of the work are... ministerial in nature."'
The court employed a similar approach to Lincoln County v. Edmond,325 a motorist's action for injuries from a tree blocking a county
road.326 Plaintiff charged the road superintendent with negligently
failing to act for a period of two hours after learning of the downed
tree.3 27 The court was adamant that any discretion enjoyed by defendant as to the manner of moving the tree "did not change the fact that

coach] before and at the time it occurred, and that nothing had happened on that
trip or in prior years to make it foreseeable that such conduct would transpire.
Id., 503 S.E.2d at 45. The court affirmed summary judgments for defendants. Id.
320. 231 Ga. App. 473, 498 S.E.2d 803 (1998).
321. Id. at 474, 498 S.E.2d at 805. Plaintiff was injured in a single car accident on a
county road and argued the county road superintendent's negligence in constructing and
maintaining the road. Id. at 473, 498 S.E.2d at 804-05. The court held that the county's
decisions in respect to change the plans, to end paving at a certain point, and to use certain
traffic signals "[were] the very essence of discretionary acts." Id. at 474, 498 S.E.2d at 805.
Thus, the court affirmed summary judgment for the county. Id.
322. Id. at 474, 498 S.E.2d at 805.
As to the actual construction of the road, [defendant] and his crew did the
subgrading under the supervision of the State Department of Transportation.
This work was done by following the grade stakes previously marked out by the
Department. [Defendant] testified he had absolutely nothing to do with the
paving process.
Id. at 474-75, 498 S.E.2d at 805.
323. The court reversed on grounds that the trial court had erred in classifying
defendant's acts as discretionary; the court expressly gave no opinion on plaintiffs
allegations of defendant's negligence in the case. Id. at 475, 498 S.E.2d at 805. Chief
Judge Andrews concurred in part and dissented in part, and Judge Beasley dissented. Id.,
498 S.E.2d at 806.
324. Id. at 474, 498 S.E.2d at 805 (quoting Joyce v. Van Arsdale, 196 Ga. App. 95, 97,
395 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1990)).
325. 231 Ga. App. 871, 501 S.E.2d 38 (1998).
326. A truck had jackknifed while trying to avoid the tree, striking a vehicle in which
plaintiff was riding. Id. at 872, 501 S.E.2d at 40.
327. Id. The tree had fallen during early morning hours after a heavy rainstorm; the
road superintendent learned of it at 6:00 a.m. and dispatched a work crew to the site at
7:30 a.m.; and the crew arrived at the site at 8:00 a.m. to discover that plaintiff's accident
had already occurred. Id. The court held that actions against the county and its board of
commissioners were barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 874, 501 S.E.2d at 41.
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the tree must be removed."32 Removal "was the performance of a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one, regardless of the elements of
'discretion' that may be present during the execution of the mandatory
job."329 Accordingly, the court held the road superintendent unprotected by official immunity.33 °
Seay v. Cleveland3 3 shifted to the issue of a county sheriff's "sovereign immunity." There, purchasers at a sheriff's sale sued the sheriff for
failure to use sale proceeds to satisfy superior liens on the property
purchased. 3 2 Because statutes left the sheriff no discretion in conducting the sale,333 the court of appeals declared the sheriff negligent
in performing "an official ministerial function,"334 thereby "forfeit[ing]
the protections of sovereign immunity."335 Taking the case on certiorari, a unanimous supreme court reversed.336 "Sovereign immunity," the
court declared, "applies equally to ministerial and discretionary
acts,"337 and the sheriff "may be held liable in his official capacity for
...negligence only to the extent the county has waived such sovereign
immunity. " " The sheriff would be liable for negligently performing
a "ministerial function," the court delineated, only "had he been sued in
his personal capacity."339 Thus, the lower courts had erred in refusing
to apply sovereign immunity to plaintiffs' claim.340

328. Id.
329. Id., 501 S.E.2d at 42.
330. Id. Whether defendant had acted negligently in performing this ministerial
function, the court held, was one for the jury. Id. at 875, 501 S.E.2d at 42.
331. 270 Ga. 64, 508 S.E.2d 159 (1998).
332. Id. at 64, 508 S.E.2d at 159. Plaintiffs were thus "required to pay off the superior
mortgages or risk losing the property and the monies paid for the property." Id.
333. O.C.G.A. § 9-13-60 (1993).
334. Seay v. Cleveland, 228 Ga. App. 836, 839, 493 S.E.2d 30, 32 (1997).
335. Id.
336. Seay v. Cleveland, 270 Ga. 64, 66, 508 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1998).
337. Id. at 65, 508 S.E.2d at 160. "The holding of the Court of Appeals ignores the
clear language of Gilbert [v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994)] finding that
sovereign immunity applies equally to ministerial and discretionary acts and improperly
limits the sovereign immunity to which the county and, therefore, [the sheriff] is entitled
under the Georgia Constitution." Id.
338. Id., 508 S.E.2d at 160-61.
339. Id., 508 S.E.2d at 161. "Although [the sheriff] might be held liable for negligent
supervision had he been sued in his personal capacity .... sovereign immunity acts as a
bar to such claims against a sheriff in his official capacity unless sovereign immunity has
been waived." Id.
340. Id., 508 S.E.2d at 160-61. "[We find that the [plaintiffs'] claims against [the
sheriff] in his official capacity are precluded under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
it has not been established... that such immunity has been waived." Id., 508 S.E.2d at
160.
"For the benefit of both the bench and bar," the court reiterated the proper approach:
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H.

Zoning
In Harrell v. Little Pup Development & Construction, Inc.,41 the
supreme court emphasized the binding nature of conditions attached to
rezoning approvals. When the county's rezoning ordinance restricted the
owner to an exit upon a specified road, the owner could create no
temporary exit on another road.342 In the absence of exceptions
entered upon the county minutes,3" the court reasoned, "'the public
is
' '
entitled to rely upon the four corners of the [rezoning] ordinance. " 4
The court was equally adamant in Lacy v. State3 45 in applying a
single family zoning ordinance to a minister who rented a portion of his
home to a financially impoverished family. 4" The defendant's "claim

a sheriff sued in his official capacity may be held liable for the negligent
performance of ministerial or discretionary acts of his employees only to the extent
the county has waived sovereign immunity because he can only be sued in his
official capacity under respondeat superior .... As to acts or omissions personal
to the sheriff, however, he may be sued in his personal capacity and will be
protected from such suits only to the extent official or qualified immunity applies.
Id. at 65 n.1, 508 S.E.2d at 161 n.1.
Obviously, the concepts in issue are confusing and semantics appear to carry inordinate
weight. Thus, in Seay the supreme court reasoned that a sheriff enjoys "official immunity"
only when sued in his "personal capacity." Id. (emphasis added). Subsequently, the court
of appeals considered Hazelwood v. Adams, 235 Ga. App. 607, 510 S.E.2d 147 (1998), a
high school student's action against a football coach for injuries allegedly suffered while
working off a discipline violation under the coach's supervision. Id. at 608, 510 S.E.2d at
148. There, the court was explicit that "the defense of official immunity ... applies to
government officials and employees sued in their official capacities,"Id., 510 S.E.2d at 149
(emphasis supplied), and proceeded to find sufficient evidence for a jury trial on whether
the coach's "discretionary" acts were done with "actual malice." Id. at 608-09, 510 S.E.2d
at 150.
341. 269 Ga. 143, 498 S.E.2d 251 (1998).
342. Id. at 143-44, 498 S.E.2d at 251. The county had rezoned property to single-family
use and modified the developer's plans for an entrance. Defendant, the present owner of
the property, had created a temporary entrance to its subdivision from another road. Id.
343. Id. at 144-45, 498 S.E.2d at 252. Defendant maintained that the county had
represented that the road specified by the condition would soon be paved and that it was
entitled to the temporary entrance until the paving was done. Said the court: "The official
minutes of the Board show no vote that the rezoning condition was to take effect only after
[the road in the condition] [was] paved." Id. at 144, 498 S.E.2d at 252.
344. Id. at 145, 498 S.E.2d at 252 (quoting Martin v. Hatfield, 251 Ga. 638, 639, 308
S.E.2d 833, 835 (1983)). The court thus reversed the trial judge's refusal to enforce the
condition. Id.
345. 270 Ga. 37, 507 S.E.2d 441 (1998).
346. Id. at 37, 507 S.E.2d at 442. Defendant, "who is a minister, contends that he was
practicing his religion by sharing his home, for a monthly rental, with a family which, due
to bankruptcy, was encountering difficulty finding a suitable place to rent." Id. Defendant
had been convicted of violating the zoning order in the trial court. Id.
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of religious liberty," the court asserted, "cannot constitute a defense
against enforcement of valid police regulations or penal laws." s47
Defendant's "religious motivation" did not render the zoning ordinance
underlying his conviction a violation of his free exercise of religion. 4
In Beugnot v. Coweta County,349 the court of appeals focused upon
a plaintiff whose sixty-six acre mobile home park, containing thirteen
homes at the time of the county's zoning ordinance, had been treated for
many years as a nonconforming use. 3 0 Upon the county's later refusal
to issue a building permit for yet another home, the court held the
nonconforming use to extend to the entire park and not simply the
portion containing the thirteen homes. 51 "With full knowledge of
[plaintiff's] intentions and the ordinance provisions, the county allowed
[plaintiff] to continue development of the entire parcel for 25 years."35 2
Accordingly, the court declared a "vested right" in plaintiff's nonconform33
ing use and reversed the trial judge's refusal to mandamus a permit.
III.

LEGISLATION

The 1999 General Assembly acted upon an assortment of local
government facets; a few examples illustrate range of coverage.

347. Id. at 38, 507 S.E.2d at 443. "In his capacity as a landlord," the court said,
defendant "did not act on behalf of a church." Id. at 37, 507 S.E.2d at 442.
348. Id. at 38, 507 S.E.2d at 443. The court thus affirmed defendant's conviction. Id.
Reaffirming a procedural principle, in DeKalb County v. DruidHills Civic Ass'n, 269 Ga.
619, 502 S.E.2d 719 (1998), the supreme court asserted that "(clivic associations do not
have standing to file suit to challenge zoning decisions." Id. at 619, 502 S.E.2d at 720.
Accordingly, plaintiff association, displeased with the county governing authority's tie vote
on the association's appeal from the grant of a variance by the zoning board, was without
standing to compel the county governing authority to "act" on the appeal. Id. "That the
remedy sought in this case was mandamus does not relax the standing requirement." Id.
349. 231 Ga. App. 715, 500 S.E.2d 28 (1998).
350. Id. at 716, 500 S.E.2d at 30. Plaintiff purchased the property in 1963 and the
county adopted its first material zoning ordinance in 1969. From 1970 to 1980 plaintiff
continued to add at least one mobile home to the park every two years as required by
ordinance, and in 1980 he began making major annual improvements to the property. The
county contended that plaintiff had abandoned his nonconforming use by failing to seek
permits for homes between 1994 and 1995. Id. at 716-17, 500 S.E.2d at 30-31.
351. Id. at 722, 500 S.E.2d at 34. "Moreover, the county's zoning ordinance does not
prohibit categorizing the proposed use of the entire 66 acres for a mobile home park as a
nonconforming use." Id. at 720, 500 S.E.2d at 33.
352. Id. at 721, 500 S.E.2d at 33.
353. Id. The court noted the circumstances for issuance of a mandamus and asserted
that "[tihe first circumstance has been met in this case, as [plaintiff] has a clear legal right
to relief given his vested right in the nonconforming use which he has not abandoned." Id.
at 722, 500 S.E.2d at 34. See R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1989).
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Among the most heralded of its actions, the legislature barred local
governments from bringing lawsuits against firearms or ammunition
manufacturers, trade associations, or dealers for damages resulting from
to the
the lawful design, manufacture, or sale of firearms or ammunition
3 55
3" Such suits may be brought only by the state.
public.
The legislature also treated the high-profile matters of open meetings
and open records. As for meetings, the statute expanded the types of
covered gatherings and required, within a period of two weeks prior to
the meeting, the posting of agenda items.3 6 When a meeting is closed,
the chairperson must file a notarized affidavit identifying the subject as
one excepted from the open meetings requirement.5 7 As for records,
the covered entity must provide requested records within three days or
specify the date of availability, and computer records must be made
available without charge. 35' The records custodian must explain any
denial of a requested record, and failure to comply with the statute is a
criminal offense.35 9
In respect to law enforcement, officers may establish "guard lines"
around jails within which no person may pass while possessing a weapon
or under the influence of drugs.3 o Local governments were authorized
to sell vehicles used in prostitution or to petition for use of the vehicle
in law enforcement, 61 and city and county attorneys may abate as
public nuisances places used for unlawful sexual purposes. 36 2 Local
governments were empowered to approve the designation and equipping
of police volunteers to assist in traffic control in the event of emergencies. 3' Finally, municipal court jurisdiction, for the offense of shoplifting, increased from $100 to $300 for the value of the property involved."' 4
The General Assembly dealt with various officials in several ways. For
instance, notary publics may not sign as an elector, or circulate a
nomination petition, a recall petition, or an application for a recall
petition.36 5 Contrarily, county commissioners and members of city

354. 1999 Ga. Laws 2 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-11-184).
355. Id.
356. 1999 Ga. Laws 549 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1, -4).

357. Id.
358.

1999 Ga. Laws 552 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70, -71.2, -72, -74).

359. Id.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.

Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws

648 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-4-13).
472 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-6-13.2).
467 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 41-2-2, -3-1.1, -3-2).
654 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 35-1-11, 40-6-2).
831 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-32-9).
23 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-132, -2-170, -4-5, -4-8).
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councils may now serve as volunteer firefighters without violating
prohibitions on holding two positions.366
The legislature refined several aspects of the "service delivery
strategies" mandate.6 7 For example, it made clear that every county
and each municipality within a county must possess a process to resolve
land use classification disputes resulting from annexations.3 68 However, the statute also extended the deadline for filing such processes to
July 1, 1999.69
Local governments received additional public welfare powers; they also
encountered additional power restrictions. On the one hand, a statute
authorized cities and counties to contract with private firms, not in
excess of twenty years, for the operation and maintenance of wastewater treatment systems, stormwater systems, water systems, and sewer
systems. 70 On the other hand, a statute required local governments
to conduct environmental tests on property intended for parks or recreational areas, and prohibited the property's acquisition until any
discovered contaminants were eliminated. 7 ' Additionally, the legislature established new standards for designating a newspaper the county
legal organ and required that once so designated, the paper must
maintain those qualifications.7 2
In the realm of taxation, the General Assembly authorized the use of
proceeds from special purpose local option sales taxes for the purchase
of major capital equipment. 73 In respect to ad valorem property taxes,
a "Taxpayer Bill of Rights" required millage rate rollbacks upon major
property revaluations. 7 4 The statute also required counties to disclose
additional information to taxpayers when tax assessments are increased,
37
Finally, the legislature
and purported to facilitate taxpayer appeals..
provided a phase-in increase of the taxpayer homestead exemption to
eventually equal up to $20,000 of assessed value. 76 The measure
specified the fashion in which the state will reimburse counties for the
revenue losses occasioned by the homestead exemption increase.37

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

1999 Ga. Laws 1248 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-60-22).
O.C.G.A. § 36-70-24 (1993).
1999 Ga. Laws 789 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 36-70-24, 36-70-27, 50-4-7, 50-8-4).
Id.
1999 Ga. Laws 80 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-60-15.1).
1999 Ga. Laws 556 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-80-18).
1999 Ga. Laws 6 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 9-13-140, -142).
1999 Ga. Laws 781 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 48-8-111).
1999 Ga. Laws 1043 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-32.1, -306, -306.1, -311).
Id.
1999 Ga. Laws 273 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 36-89-1 to -6).
Id.
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CONCLUSION

Like the prominence of the humbled citizen in recorder's court,
developments in local government law this year, both by volume and by
substance, render highly inordinate a responsive plea of "low profile."

